Privacy Preserving Distributed Data Mining by Lin, Zhenmin
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
Theses and Dissertations--Computer Science Computer Science 
2012 
Privacy Preserving Distributed Data Mining 
Zhenmin Lin 
University of Kentucky, zlin2@uky.edu 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Lin, Zhenmin, "Privacy Preserving Distributed Data Mining" (2012). Theses and Dissertations--Computer 
Science. 9. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/cs_etds/9 
This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Computer Science at UKnowledge. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--Computer Science by an authorized administrator of 
UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
STUDENT AGREEMENT: 
I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution 
has been given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining 
any needed copyright permissions. I have obtained and attached hereto needed written 
permission statements(s) from the owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be 
included in my work, allowing electronic distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use 
doctrine). 
I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the non-exclusive license to archive 
and make accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known. 
I agree that the document mentioned above may be made available immediately for worldwide 
access unless a preapproved embargo applies. 
I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in 
future works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work. I understand that I am free to 
register the copyright to my work. 
REVIEW, APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE 
The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on 
behalf of the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of 
the program; we verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s dissertation 
including all changes required by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by 
the statements above. 
Zhenmin Lin, Student 
Dr. Jerzy W. Jaromczyk, Major Professor 
Dr. Raphael Finkel, Director of Graduate Studies 
PRIVACY PRESERVING DISTRIBUTED DATA MINING
DISSERTATION
A dissertation submitted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
College of Engineering at the
University of Kentucky
By
Zhenmin Lin
Lexington, Kentucky
Director: Dr. Jerzy W. Jaromczyk
Lexington, Kentucky 2012
Copyright cO Zhenmin Lin 2012
ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
PRIVACY PRESERVING DISTRIBUTED DATA MINING
Privacy preserving distributed data mining aims to design secure protocols which
allow multiple parties to conduct collaborative data mining while protecting the data
privacy. My research focuses on the design and implementation of privacy preserving
two-party protocols based on homomorphic encryption. I present new results in this
area, including new secure protocols for basic operations and two fundamental privacy
preserving data mining protocols.
I propose a number of secure protocols for basic operations in the additive secret-
sharing scheme based on homomorphic encryption. I derive a basic relationship be-
tween a secret number and its shares, with which we develop efficient secure compar-
ison and secure division with public divisor protocols. I also design a secure inverse
square root protocol based on Newton's iterative method and hence propose a solu-
tion for the secure square root problem. In addition, we propose a secure exponential
protocol based on Taylor series expansions. All these protocols are implemented using
secure multiplication and can be used to develop privacy preserving distributed data
mining protocols.
In particular, I develop efficient privacy preserving protocols for two fundamental
data mining tasks: multiple linear regression and EM clustering. Both protocols work
for arbitrarily partitioned datasets. The two-party privacy preserving linear regression
protocol is provably secure in the semi-honest model, and the EM clustering protocol
discloses only the number of iterations. I provide a proof-of-concept implementation
of these protocols in C++, based on the Paillier cryptosystem.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Privacy preserving distributed data mining aims to design secure protocols which
allow multiple parties to conduct collaborative data mining while protecting the pri-
vacy of their data. My research focuses on the design and implementation of privacy
preserving protocols based on homomorphic encryption. I have designed new secure
protocols for a number of basic operations, including comparison, inverse square root,
square root and the exponential function. Using these protocols I develop two funda-
mental privacy preserving data mining protocols: multiple linear regression and EM
clustering.
Data mining attempts to discover potentially useful and interesting patterns from
large quantities of data. Many useful techniques have been developed in this area,
include clustering, classification, regression, association rule mining and outlier de-
tection. They have been been successfully applied in domains ranging from business
to science and engineering. For example, in market basket analysis, association rule
mining is used to find the purchase patterns of customers. The supermarket can use
such knowledge to plan product placement and promotional pricing.
In many applications data may be collected and owned by multiple parties. For
example, for a group of persons, the employer companies have their employment
information, banks have the financial information, and hospitals have the health data.
Suppose that the whole dataset can be represented as a matrix whose rows correspond
to subjects and whose columns correspond to attributes. It can be distributed among
the parties in two typical ways:
(a) Vertical partition. All the parties have the same set of subjects, but each party
has a different set of attributes. The set of data held by employer companies, banks
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and hospitals is an example of vertical partition.
(b) Horizontal partition. Multiple parties have disjoint sets of subjects, and each
party has the data of all the attributes for each subject he/she holds. For example,
different colleges have information on disjoint sets of students.
In some cases the dataset may be arbitrarily partitioned among multiple parties.
That is, each party holds part of the dataset in an arbitrary way. This includes
vertical partition and horizontal partition as special cases.
When data are distributed among multiple parties, collaborative data mining has
the potential to produce more accurate knowledge than the use of data owned by a
single party. However, privacy concerns, due to conflict of interests or legal regulation,
may prevent such applications. Consider the following examples:
(a) Two clinics, each of which has the patient data for one disease, conjecture that
these two diseases may be correlated. They wish to conduct a joint analysis to verify
the conjecture. However, due to law regulation, they are prohibited from disclosing
their individual data to each other (Zhang et al., 2006).
(b) The garment market is highly competitive. To raise their competitiveness
in this market, two companies would like to cooperate to analyze their joint sales
data to obtain knowledge such as how the sale of a particular category of garment is
distributed in different regions. However, these two companies compete against each
other, so they may not be willing to disclose their data.
Privacy preserving distributed data mining addresses this issue and aims to design
secure protocols which allow multiple parties to conduct collaborative data mining
while protecting the privacy of their data. It has attracted much attention and has
become an active research area in recent years.
Secure computation aims to design secure protocols so that a set of parties can
perform joint computation privately. The concepts and techniques in secure compu-
tation can be applied to the area of privacy preserving distributed data mining. My
research focuses on the design of privacy preserving data mining protocols based on
homomorphic encryption.
1.2 Short Survey on Data Privacy
In this section, I briefly introduce some related work in the area of privacy preserving
data mining, including privacy preserving distributed data mining, data perturbation,
anonymization and differential privacy.
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Privacy Preserving Distributed Data Mining. Lindell and Pinkas (2000)
first applied the concept of secure computation in the field of data mining and de-
veloped a provably secure two-party decision tree over horizontally partitioned data.
Since then, privacy preserving distributed data mining has attracted much attention
and many secure protocols have been proposed for specific data mining algorithms,
including support vector machines (Laur et al., 2006; Vaidya and Clifton, 2008a),
Bayesian network (Yang and Wright, 2006), k-nearest neighbor (Qi et al., 2008), k-
means (Vaidya et al., 2003; Bunn et al., 2007), EM -clustering (Lin et al., 2005),
regression (Du et al., 2004; Sanil et al., 2004; Hall et al. 2011), association rules min-
ing (Viadya and Clifton, 2002; Kantarcioulu and Clifton, 2004; Viadya and Clifton,
2005) and outlier detection (Vaidya and Clifton, 2004b).
Some of these protocols are provably secure in the semi-honest model, such as
the secure protocols for decision tree (Lindell and Pinkas, 2000), k-means (Bunn et
al., 2007) and support vector machine (Laur et al., 2006). Some protocols choose to
disclose additional information to achieve better efficiency. For example, the secure
support vector machine proposed by Vaidya et al. (2008) discloses the kernel matrix.
Other protocols use algebraic techniques to protect the private data. For example,
a vector or matrix is protected by multiplying with random matrices (Viadya and
Clifton, 2002; Du et al., 2004). However, one should be cautious of using such methods
because they may leak significant information (Goethals et al., 2004).
Data Perturbation. Suppose that a government agency would like to publish a
set of electronic health records which may facilitate research. One strategy for pro-
tecting the privacy of the individual records is to perturb the original data. Agrawal
et al. (2000) proposed an additive perturbation method which adds Gaussian noise
to the data and they constructed decision tree on the perturbed data to demonstrate
its utility. Chen et al. (2005) proposed a random rotation method which multiplies
the original data matrix with a random orthogonal matrix. This method can pre-
serve the distances of the original data points. Liu. et al. (2006) proposed a random
projection-based multiplicative perturbation method in which the set of data points
from high-dimensional space are projected to a randomly chosen low-dimensional
subspace.
Anonymization. One obvious way to protect the privacy of tabular data is to
remove the identity attributes such as social security number and name. However,
this is not sufficient because the combination of some attributes such as age, sex and
address can be linked with external data and discloses the identity of the record.
These attributes are called quasi-identifiers. A table is said to be k-anonymous if
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every record is indistinguishable from at least k − 1 other records over the quasi-
identifier attributes (Sweeney, 2002a). To achieve k-anonymity, we can replace quasi-
identifier attributes values with values that are less specific but semantically consistent
(Sweeeny, 2002b).
Differential Privacy. In the scenario of a statistical database, a trusted curator
collects a set of sensitive information (e.g. medical records). He/she answers the
queries issued by the users and provides the statistical information about the data.
But he/she doesn't want to compromise the privacy of individual records in the
database.
We can model the actions of the trusted curator as a randomized algorithm A.
A randomized algorithm A guarantees -differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006) if,
when D1 and D2 are a pair of datasets that differ on a single element, then for all
S ⊆ Range(A),
Pr[A(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp() ∗ Pr[A(D2) ∈ S]
where the probability is taken over the coin tosses of A. This means that for any two
datasets which are close to one another, a differentially private mechanism will behave
approximately the same on both datasets. This definition gives a strong guarantee
that the presence or absence of an individual (single element) will not affect the final
output of the query significantly.
When the query is a real-valued function, one method to achieve -differential pri-
vacy is to add Laplace noise according to the sensitivity of the query function (Dwork
et al., 2006). When the query maps the database to some discrete structures such as
strings or trees, McSherry and Twalwar (2007) proposed an exponential mechanism
to provide -differential privacy.
1.3 Contributions
The focus of my research is to design privacy-preserving distributed data mining
protocols with secure computation techniques. I implemented privacy-preserving data
mining protocols based on homomorphic encryption. I have designed new secure
protocols for a number of basic operations and used these protocols to develop privacy
preserving distributed data mining protocols. I summarize our contributions below.
1. New secure protocols for basic operations. I derived a basic relation-
ship between a secret and its two shares when we used the additive secret-sharing
scheme based on homomorphic encryption (section 3.2.1). With this relationship we
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developed two efficient secure protocols: secure comparison (section 3.2) and secure
division with public divisor (section 4.5). The new secure comparison protocol needs
only 2L + O(1) secure multiplications when the comparands belong to a known in-
terval [0, 2L). Existing protocols require at least 12L + O(1) secure multiplications
(Bunn et al., 2007; Qi et al., 2008).
In addition, we designed a secure inverse square root protocol based on the Newton
iterative method and hence we proposed a solution for secure square root (section
4.6.1). I also developed an efficient secure exponential protocol based on Taylor's
series explanation (section 5.4.2). All these protocols are implemented using secure
multiplication and can be used to develop privacy preserving data mining protocols.
2. Design and Implementation of fundamental privacy preserving data
mining protocols. I have developed privacy preserving protocols for two funda-
mental data mining tasks: multiple linear regression and EM clustering. Privacy
preserving linear regression and EM clustering have been studied in the literature.
Sanil et al. (2004) proposed a privacy preserving linear regression protocol based on
the Powell iterative method. It addresses only the case of vertical partition and dis-
closes aggregate information during each iteration. Du et .. (2004) proposed secure
matrix multiplication and secure matrix inverse protocols and hence designed pri-
vacy preserving linear regression protocols for vertically partitioned datasets. Their
method protects the data matrix by multiplying with random matrices, which can-
not provide theoretical guarantee about privacy. Hall et al. (2011) presented secure
linear regression protocols for arbitrarily partitioned datasets based on homomorphic
encryption. They designed a secure protocol to invert a matrix, which they used to
invert normal matrices and solve normal equations. Generally, it is not desirable to
solve normal equations by inverting the normal matrices because inverting a matrix
is more expensive and the normal matrix may be ill-conditioned. I designed privacy
preserving multiple linear regression protocols based on the stable QR-decomposition
method (chapter 4). They work for arbitrarily partitioned datasets The two-party
protocol is provably secure in the semi-honest model.
Lin et al. (2004) presented a privacy preserving EM clustering over horizontally
partitioned datasets. Their method chooses to disclose the means and the covariance
matrix. I proposed a privacy preserving EM clustering protocol over arbitrarily
partitioned datasets, which includes vertical partition and horizontal partition as
special cases. This is the first solution for vertically partitioned datasets. Our two-
party protocol discloses only the number of iterations.
Due to the computational cost of encryption/decryption operations and the com-
5
plexity of data mining tasks, an important concern is whether privacy preserving data
mining protocols are practical or they are of only theoretical interest. I have imple-
mented our privacy preserving multiple linear regression and EM clustering algo-
rithms in C++ based on the Paillier cryptosystem and evaluated their performances
over benchmark datasets. Our experiments show that although the executions of
secure protocols are generally slow, they are feasible for small datasets. Further im-
provements and new techniques are needed to make them more practical for larger
datasets.
3. Application of the Schur Complement. When data are distributed among
multiple parties, the dataset can be represented as a block matrix with each block
held by a party. I explored the possibility of using the structure of the block matrix
to design efficient privacy preserving data mining protocols. In particular, I studied
the potential application of the Schur Complement in the design of efficient kernel
ridge regression protocol (chapter 6).
Copyright cOZhenmin Lin 2012
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Chapter 2
Secure Computation
2.1 Introduction
The focus of my research is to design privacy-preserving distributed data mining pro-
tocols with secure computation techniques. I design privacy-preserving data mining
protocols based on homomorphic encryption. In particular, I implement secure pro-
tocols using the Paillier cryptosystem. In this chapter, I introduce the background
knowledge in secure computation and the additive secret-sharing scheme based on
homomorphic encryption.
This chapter is organized as follows. I first introduce the concepts in secure com-
putation in section 2.2. In section 2.3.1, I describe the Paillier cryptosystem, which I
use to implement privacy preserving data mining protocols. It is homomorphic, and
semantically secure based on some computational assumption. I then describe the
additive secret-sharing scheme based on homomorphic encryption in section 2.3.2.
The presentation of secure computation in section 2.2 is based on the material from
(Goldreich, 2004).
2.2 Concepts in Secure Computation
Let f : ({0, 1}∗)m → ({0, 1}∗)m be an m-ary functionality 1 which maps m inputs
(x1, . . . , xm) to m outputs, (y1, . . . , ym) = f(x1, . . . , xm). Here f can be deterministic
or randomized. We write yi = fi(x1, . . . , xm). For the moment, we assume that
all xi are of the same length. I will discuss later the issues related to relax this
1In the area of secure computation, the notion of an m-ary functionality refers to a random
process which maps m inputs to m outputs, where functions mapping m inputs to m outputs are a
special case. Functionalities are randomized extension of ordinary functions.
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assumption. Suppose that there are m parties, each holding a local input xi. A
multi-party protocol for computing the functionality f is a protocol such that if all
the parties compute and communicate as specified by the protocol, each party i will
obtain his/her desired output yi = fi(x1, ..., xm) when the protocol finishes. We
assume that the functionality f is polynomial-time computable and the protocol runs
in polynomial time of the input length.
During the execution of the protocol, the participating parties need to communi-
cate with each other with messages. These message may contain sensitive information.
Secure computation is concerned about the privacy of the involved parties when they
interact with each other. A protocol is considered to be secure if the participating
parties don't disclose any information more than necessary. We require that what a
party can learn from the joint computation can be inferred from his/her own input
and output. More generally, we require that even if a subset of parties collude, what
they can learn from the joint computation can be inferred from their own inputs and
outputs.
To give a formal definition of privacy, we need the concept of computational
indistinguishability.
Definition 2.1. (Goldreich, 2004) Let X = {Xk}k=1,2,... and Y = {Yk}k=1,2,... be two
probabilistic ensembles. X and Y are said to be computationally indistinguishable,
denoted by
{Xk}k=1,2,... ' {Yk}k=1,2,...,
if for every family of polynomial-size circuits {Ck}, every positive polynomial p and
all sufficiently large k, it holds that
|Prob(Ck(Xk) = 1)− Prob(Ck(Yk) = 1)| < 1
p(k)
. (2.1)
The formal definition of privacy can be given based on the simulation paradigm.
Suppose that thesem parties use a protocol Π to compute the functionality f(x1, . . . , xm).
Initially, each party i holds a local input xi and is supplied with some random coins
ri which are used as the random source for the execution of the protocol. In addition,
we also supply each party with a security parameter 1k. Then these parties perform
the computation and communication as specified by the protocol Π and output the
results when the protocol finishes.
Let x = (x1, . . . , xm). We denote the output of party i by Πi(1
k, x) and the outputs
of the protocol by Π(1k, x) = (Πi(1
k, x), . . . ,Πm(1
k, x)). The view of party i during
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the execution of the protocol Π is defined as the collection of the security parameter
1k, his/her input xi, his/her internal coin toss ri and all the messages he/she has
received during the joint computation (m1, ...,mti),
V IEWΠi (1
k, x) = (1k, xi, ri,m1, . . . ,mti).
Given a subset of parties I = {i1, . . . , is} ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, we let fI(x) = (fi1 , . . . , fis)
and define
V IEWΠI (1
k, x) = (V IEWΠi1 (1
k, x), . . . , V IEWΠis (1
k, x)).
Suppose that a subset of the parties I collude and they try to infer extra informa-
tion from the computation. We assume the semi-honest model. That is, we assume
that all the parties follow the protocol and the colluding parties only try to infer useful
information from the messages they have received during the joint computation.
Note that in the semi-honest model, all the information these colluding parties
obtain is contained in the view of these parties. We consider a protocol to be secure if
the view of these colluding parties I can be simulated based on the their own inputs
and outputs. That is, there exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm, given
the inputs and the outputs of the colluding parties I, can simulate the view of these
parties. We call this algorithm the simulator. The simulation here means that the
output of the simulator is computationally indistinguishable from the view of the
colluding parties I.
Definition 2.2. Let Π be a protocol for m parties to compute the m-ary functionality
f . We say that Π privately 2 computes f if there exists a probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm, denoted by S, such that for every I ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}, it holds that
{(S(I, 1k, xI , fI(x)), f(x))}k=1,2,... ' {(V IEWI(1k, x),Π(1k, x))}k=1,2,....
Definition 2.2 says that even if a subset of parties I collude, the information they
can obtain can be efficiently simulated based only on their own inputs and outputs.
Note that when we say Π is a protocol to compute f , we mean the output of the
protocol Π(x) is identically distributed with f(x). The above definition guarantees
both the correctness and the security of the protocol.
An important special case is secure two-party computation.
2In this paper, I use the terms secure and private, securely and privately interchangeably.
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Definition 2.3. Suppose that f is a two-ary functionality (y1, y2) = f(x1, x2), y1 =
f1(x1, x2) and y2 = f2(x1, x2). Let Π be a protocol for 2 parties to compute f . We
say that Π privately computes f if there exists two probabilistic polynomial time algo-
rithms, denoted by S1 and S2, such that
{(S1(1k, x1, f1(x)), f(x))}k=1,2,... ' {(V IEW1(1k, x),Π(1k, x))}k=1,2,... (2.2)
{(S2(1k, x2, f2(x)), f(x))}k=1,2,... ' {(V IEW2(1k, x),Π(1k, x))}k=1,2,.... (2.3)
In the definition of secure computation we assume that all the inputs have the
same lengths. The reason is that in a protocol to compute any functionality, the
program of a party usually depends on the lengths of other parties' inputs. One way
to ensure this is to pad the inputs with zeros. Another method is simply to add the
lengths of all the inputs as a part of the input of each party. This is more practical in
the field of privacy preserving distributed data mining. For example, in the vertically
partitioned datasets, we assume that each party knows the number of objects and the
numbers of the attributes held by other parties.
Modular Composition of Secure Protocols. A protocol can be augmented
with access to an oracle for some functionality g. The access to an oracle means that
if each party i provides xi and they invoke the oracle, they will get the results of
g(x1, . . . , xm) instantly without any computational cost. We can define the security
of an oracle-aided protocol in the same way as for the ordinary protocol except that
the results of the invocations of the oracles are treated as messages and are included
in the views of the parties.
Suppose that a protocol Π with an access to the oracle for the functionality g
privately computes the functionality f and a secure protocol Ψ privately computes g.
If we replace the access to the oracle for g in the protocol Π with the secure protocol Ψ,
the composition theorem (Goldreich, 2004, page 673) says that the resulting protocol
privately computes the functionality f .
To use the composition theorem, we need to show that Ψ securely computes g
and that the protocol Π with an access to the oracle for g privately computes f . The
composition theorem allows us to design secure protocols in a modular way. If the
functionality to be computed can be implemented using a number of procedures, we
can design new secure protocol or use existing protocol for each procedure and then
assemble them together to design a secure protocol for the whole functionality.
Feasibility Results. Yao (1988) proposed a general construction of secure pro-
tocol for any function in two-party cases. We know that every function can be rep-
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resented as a circuit. The first party constructs a "scrambled" circuit which consists
of pairs of encrypted secrets that correspond to the wires of the original circuit and
gadgets that correspond to the gates of the original circuit. The gadget is constructed
in such a way that the knowledge of secrets corresponding to the wire entering the
gates yields a secret corresponding to the wire that exists the gate. The first party
sends the "scrambled" circuit to the second party. The second party "evaluates" the
"scrambled" circuit from top (input wires) to bottom (output wires), obtaining the
result, and sends it to the first party.
Goldreich et al. (1987) extended the results by Yao and proposed a secure protocol
for any functionality in multi-party cases. The functionality is expressed as a circuit
which consists of only AND and NOT gates. Each bit corresponding to a wire is
shared by all the parties which each hold a random bit that sums to the secret mod 2.
The computation propagates from top (input wires) to bottom (output wires) along
the circuit. When a NOT gate is encountered, the first party flips its bit and all other
parties maintain their bit values. The secure computation of an AND gate in the
multi-party case can be reduced to the secure computation of an AND operation in
two-party case, which can be implemented using oblivious transfer.
The existence of general construction of secure protocols for any functionality may
be sufficient for traditional cryptographic applications, such as secure exchange and
key management. However, data mining deals with large datasets and such general
constructions may be not efficient. Design of efficient secure protocols for specific
data mining tasks has been an active research topic in the past ten years.
2.3 Additive Secret-Sharing Scheme Based on Ho-
momorphic Encryption
I first introduce the Paillier cryptosystem in subsection 2.3.1. The Paillier cryptosys-
tem is homomorphic and semantically secure. I then describe the additive secret-
sharing scheme based on homomorphic encryption in subsection 2.3.2. I use this
scheme to design privacy preserving data mining protocols in the following chapters.
2.3.1 Paillier Cryptosystem and Homomorphic Encryption
An encryption scheme is a triple (G,E,D) of probabilistic polynomial-time algo-
rithms, where G is the key-generator algorithm, E is the encryption algorithm and
D is the decryption algorithm. Given input 1k, the algorithm G outputs a pair of
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bit strings (e, d) = G(1k), where e is the encryption key and d is the corresponding
decryption key. Here k is the security parameter. We often write G = (G1, G2) and
e = G1(1
k) , d = G2(1
k).
Given a pair of encryption/decryption keys (e, d), we can encrypt a message α ∈
{0, 1}k using E(e, α) and decrypt a ciphertext β using D(d, β). We may write E(e, α)
as Ee(α) and D(d, β) as Dd(β). When no confusion will be caused, we often omit the
encryption and decryption keys and write them as E(α) and D(β), respectively. The
encryption algorithm E and decryption algorithm D satisfy
Pr[D(d,E(e, α))] = α] = 1,
where the probability is taken over the internal coin tosses of the algorithms E and
D.
In the public-key encryption scheme, a party, say P , uses the algorithm G to
generate a pair of keys (e, d). He/she keeps the decryption key d private and publi-
cizes the encryption key e. Any other party can send party P private messages by
encrypting them using the public key e. Only party P can decrypt these messages
using his/her private key d, but nobody else can do that.
The particular cryptosystem we use in the design and implementation of secure
protocols is the Paillier cryptosystem. It was invented by Pascal Paillier in 1999. The
Paillier cryptosystem generates the pair of encryption/decryption keys as follows.
Given the security parameter 1k, the key generator G chooses randomly two large
prime numbers p and q such that gcd(pq, (p−1)(q−1)) = 1. Let the modulus n = pq
and λ = lcm(p− 1, q− 1). The security parameter k is the bit length of the modulus
n. The algorithm G then selects a random integer g from ∈ Z∗n2 and computes
µ = (L(gλ mod n2))−1 mod n, where the function L is defined as L(x) = b(x− 1)/nc.
The public (encryption) key is (n, g) and the corresponding private (decryption) key
is (λ, µ). Note that the modulus n is contained in the public key. If p and q are
of equal length, a simpler variant of the above key generation procedure is to set
g = n+ 1, λ = (p− 1)(q − 1) and µ = λ−1 mod n.
The Paillier cryptosystem is a probabilistic encryption scheme. To encrypt a
message m ∈ Zn, we select a random integer r ∈ Z∗n and compute the ciphertext
as c = E(m, r) = gmrn mod n2. We often omit the random number r and write
E(m, r) as E(m). Given a ciphertext c ∈ Z∗n2 , we can decrypt it using the formula
m = D(c) = L(cλ mod n2)µ mod n.
Proposition 2.1. The Paillier cryptosystem is a homomorphic cryptosystem.
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That is, given two messages m1,m2 ∈ Zn, we have
D(E(m1) · E(m2) mod n2) = (m1 +m2) mod n (2.4)
D(E(m1)
m2 mod n2) = (m1m2) mod n. (2.5)
For convenience, we often write equations (2.4) and 2.5 as
E(m1 +m2) = E(m1)E(m2) (2.6)
E(m1m2) = E(m1)
m2 . (2.7)
The homomorphic property allows us to perform operations on the encrypted
messages without decrypting them. This is an important property we use to design
secure protocols, as I will show in next section.
The security of the Paillier cryptosystem is based on the decisional composite
residuosity assumption (DCRA), which states that given a composite n and an integer
z, it is computationally intractable to decide whether z is an n-residual modulo n2 or
not, i.e., whether there exists y such that z = yn mod n2.
Proposition 2.2. If the decisional composite residuosity assumption holds, the Pail-
lier cryptosystem is semantically secure. That is, for every family of polynomial-size
circuits Ck and for every polynomial p, all sufficiently large k, any x, y ∈ {0, 1}k,
|Pr[Ck(G1(1k), EG1(1k)(x)) = 1]− Pr[Ck(G1(1k), EG1(1k)(y)) = 1]| <
1
p(k)
. (2.8)
Equation 2.8 states that the cryptosystem is secure against one message attack.
It is known that it implies that the cryptosystem is secure against multiple messages
attack (Goldreich, 2004). That is, for every family of polynomial-size circuits Ck,
for every polynomial p, all sufficiently large k, any two sequences of messages x =
(x1, . . . , xt(k)) and y = (y1, . . . , yt(k)) such that xi, yi ∈ {0, 1}k and t(k) is a polynomial
of k, it holds that
|Pr[Ck(G1(1k), EG1(1k)(x)) = 1]− Pr[Ck(G1(1k), EG1(1k)(y)) = 1]| <
1
p(k)
, (2.9)
where
EG1(1k)(x) = (EG1(1k)(x1), . . . , EG1(1k)(xt(k)))
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EG1(1k)(y) = (EG1(1k)(y1), . . . , EG1(1k)(yt(k))).
Note that equation 2.9 states exactly that (G1(1
k), EG1(1k)(x)) and (G1(1
k), EG1(1k)(y))
are computationally indistinguishable.
2.3.2 Additive Secret-Sharing Scheme
One important technique for the design and implementation of two-party secure com-
putation and privacy preserving data mining protocols is based on the additive
secret-sharing scheme using homomorphic encryption (Bansal et al., 2011; Hall
et al. 2011). To be concrete, I use the Paillier cryptosystem as the homomorphic
encryption scheme. Suppose that there are two parties, Alice and Bob. Alice has the
decryption (private) key d and both Alice and Bob know the encryption (public) key
e. The plaintext domain is Zn = {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} and the corresponding ciphertext
domain is Zn2 = {0, 1, . . . , n2 − 1}. Note that in the Paillier system e = (n, g) as
defined in last section.
In the additive secret-sharing scheme based on homomorphic encryption, we try
to maintain secret numbers between Alice and Bob in such a way that neither person
knows the number but they still perform basic operations on these numbers. For
each number x in the plaintext domain, Alice holds a number xA ∈ Zn and Bob
holds a number xB such that x = (xA + xB) mod n. We call xA Alice's share and
xB Bob's share. Since Alice only knows her share and Bob only knows his share,
neither of them knows the number x. In this way we can hide x as a secret between
Alice and Bob. As a convention, I use the subscript or superscript A to denote the
shares Alice holds and the subscript or superscript B to denote the shares Bob holds.
When no confusion will be caused, we omit the modulus in the expression and write
x = xA + xB.
I now discuss how to perform secure addition and secure multiplication in the
additive secret-sharing scheme. Given two secrets x = (xA + xB) mod n and y =
(yA + yB) mod n, it is straightforward to compute their sum. Alice adds her shares
zA = (xA + yA) mod n, Bob adds his shares zB = (xB + yB) mod n, then zA, zB
are shares of the secret z = x + y. Note that no encryption/decryption operation is
needed and no communication is invoked in this procedure at all.
It is more involved to privately multiple two secrets. Lindell and Pinkas (2000)
mentioned that private polynomial evaluation can be performed based on homomor-
phic encryption. Yang et al. (2006) and Goethals et al. (2005) presented secure
scalar product based on homomorphic encryption, respectively. Secure multiplication
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is a special case of secure scalar product. I present secure multiplication below.
Protocol 2.1 Secure multiplication
Input: two secrets x and y are split between Alice and Bob, x = (xA + xB) mod n,
y = (yA + yB) mod n.
Output: Alice and Bob obtain their respective shares of z = xy.
1: Alice encrypts xA and yA, m1 = E(xA, s1), m2 = E(yA, s2), where s1 and s2 are
uniformly random numbers in Z∗n, and sends them to Bob.
2: Bob computes p1 = m
yB
1 mod n
2 and p2 = m
xB
2 mod n
2.
Bob encrypts a uniformly random number r ∈ Zn, p3 = E(r, s3), where s3 is
uniformly random in Z∗n.
Bob computes m3 = (p1p2p3) mod n
2 and sends it back to Alice.
Bob sets zB = (xByB − r) mod n.
3: Alice decrypts q = D(m3).
Alice sets zA = (q + xAyA) mod n.
Note that in Protocol 2.1,
m3 = p1p2p3 (mod n
2)
= myB1 m
xB
2 E(r, s3) (mod n
2)
= E(xA, s1)
yBE(yA, s2)
xBE(r, s3) (mod n
2)
= (gxAsn1 )
yB(gyAsn2 )
xBgrsn3 (mod n
2)
= gxAyB+yAxB+r(syB1 s
xB
2 s3)
n (mod n2)
= E(xAyB + yAxB + r, s
yB
1 s
xB
2 s3)
q = D(m3)
= xAyB + yAxB + r (mod n)
zA = q + xAyA (mod n)
= xAyB + xByA + xAyA + r (mod n)
zB = xAyB − r (mod n)
zA + zB = xy (mod n).
So zA and zB are shares of z = xy. We use Protocol 2.1 as a basic building block
to implement other secure protocols. At the very beginning of those secure protocols,
Alice generates a pair of keys (e, d) = G(1k) and sends the public key e to Bob. Then
Alice and Bob use the key pair (e, d) to encrypt and decrypt messages There are two
important facts about the secure multiplication which are used to prove the security
of protocols.
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(1) Alice receives only one message m3 = E(xAyB +yAxB +r, s
yB
1 s
xB
2 s3) from Bob,
which is an encryption of a random number. If we choose any random number r′ in
Zn and another random number s
′ in Z∗n, then E(r
′, s′) is identically distributed with
m3 no matter what xA, xB, yA, yB are and no matter what s1 and s2 Alice has chosen
to encrypt messages.
(2) Bob receives two messages m1 = E(xA) and m2 = E(yA) from Alice. If we
encrypt two messages m′1 = E(0) and m
′
2 = E(0), then according to Proposition
2.2, (e,m1,m2) and (e,m
′
1,m
′
2) are computationally indistinguishable (e = G1(1
k) is
treated as a random variable).
Now we know how to perform secure addition and secure multiplication in the
additive secret-sharing scheme based on homomorphic encryption. If any function
can be computed using addition and multiplication, then we are able to implement
a secure protocol for the function using secure addition and secure multiplication.
Inspired by this idea, I develop a number of new secure protocols for basic operations
and use these protocols to design privacy preserving distributed data mining protocols.
Because secure addition is trivial in the additive secret-sharing scheme, I often say
that we implement a secure protocol using secure multiplication, although secure
addition is also needed.
Copyright cOZhenmin Lin 2012
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Chapter 3
An Efficient Secure Comparison
Protocol
3.1 Introduction
Number comparison is a common operation in the implementation of data mining
algorithms. For example, the k-means clustering algorithm assigns a point to the
closest cluster, and the k-nearest neighbor method assigns a point to the class most
common in its k nearest neighbors, both of which need to compare distances. In
particular, many data mining and machine learning algorithms, such as support vector
machine and neural network, are implemented with iterative procedures, in which the
stopping criterion is usually to compare some quantity with a threshold.
Secure comparison is a fundamental problem in the area of secure computation
and privacy preserving data mining. Design of efficient secure comparison protocol
is of practical importance in the implementation of privacy preserving data mining
protocols. In this chapter, I propose an efficient secure comparison protocol based
on homomorphic encryption (Lin and Jaromczyk, 2012). This protocol requires 2L+
O(1) secure multiplications when the comparands belong to a known interval [0, 2L).
Previous protocols require at least 12L+O(1) secure multiplications. To demonstrate
the efficiency of the new secure comparison protocol, I implement a privacy preserving
two-party k-means clustering protocol (Bunn et al., 2007). Experimental results show
that the new secure comparison protocol can improve the performance of the privacy
preserving k-means protocol substantially.
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, I derive a basic relationship
between a secret number and its shares and hence propose an efficient secure com-
parison protocol. I discuss previous work on secure comparison in section 3.3 and
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then present the privacy preserving k-means clustering algorithm in section 3.4. Ex-
perimental results on secure comparison and privacy preserving k-means clustering
protocols are presented in section 3.5.
3.2 Secure Comparison
In this section, I first derive a basic relationship between a secret number and its
shares. With this relationship I propose an efficient comparison protocol in section
3.2.2.
3.2.1 A Basic Relationship Between a Secret and Its Shares
Suppose that we are using the additive secret-sharing scheme based on homomorphic
encryption to design secure protocols (section 2.3.2). We denote the plaintext domain
of the underlying cryptosystem by ZN = {0, 1, . . . , N−1}1. To represent both positive
and negative integers in the domain ZN , a possible way is to make the assumption
that all the considered integers x have absolute values |x| < N/2. If x ≥ 0, it is
represented as x in ZN ; if x < 0, then it is represented as x+N in ZN . For example,
if x = −1, it is represented as N − 1. Now we make a little stronger assumption
that all the considered integers x have absolute values |x| < N/3. This assumption is
simple but very useful. As we shall see shortly, it enables us to derive a relationship
between a secret number and its shares, with which we are able to design an efficient
secure comparison protocol.
Suppose that a secret x is split between Alice and Bob, x = xA + xB (mod N).
Note that xA ∈ [0, N), xB ∈ [0, N), and, by assumption, x ∈ (−N/3, N/3). We
consider the relationship between x and its two shares xA and xB without referring
to modular operations. There are three possibilities.
x = xA + xB;
x = xA + xB − 2N ;
x = xA + xB −N.
We divide the interval [0, N) into three sub-intervals [0, N/3), [N/3, 2N/3) and
[2N/3, N). According to the ranges of xA and xB, we are able to determine which
1Hereafter, I use N to denote the modulus of the cryptosystem and K to denote the security
parameter. I reserve n for the number of observations in datasets and k for the number of clusters
in clustering tasks.
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one of the above equations holds.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that x ∈ (−N/3, N/3), xA, xB ∈ [0, N), x = xA + xB
(mod N). The following holds:
(i) If xA, xB ∈ [0, N/3), then x = xA + xB;
(ii) If xA, xB ∈ [2N/3, N), then x = xA + xB − 2N ;
(iii) In all other cases, x = xA + xB −N .
Proof. (i) If xA, xB ∈ [0, N/3), then xA + xB − N ∈ [−N,−N/3), xA + xB − 2N ∈
[−2N,−4N/3). Neither [−N,−N/3) nor [−2N,−4N/3) intersects with (−3/N,N/3).
So we must have x = xA + xB.
(ii) If xA, xB ∈ [2N/3, N), then xA + xB ∈ [4N/3, 2N), xA + xB −N ∈ [N/3, N).
Neither [4N/3, 2N) nor [N/3, N) intersects with (−N/3, N/3). So we have x = xA +
xB − 2N .
(iii) As an example, we consider the case when xA, xB ∈ [N/3, 2N/3). In this
case, xA + xB ∈ [2N/3, 4N/3), xA + xB − 2N ∈ [−4N/3,−2N/3). Note that x ∈
(−N/3, N/3), so we must have x = xA + xB − N . Similar arguments hold for other
cases.
Corollary 3.2. Define α = 1 if xA, xB ∈ [0, N/3) and 0 otherwise, β = 1 if xA, xB ∈
[2N/3, N) and 0 otherwise. Let γ = 1− α + β, then
x = xA + xB − γN. (3.1)
Proof. Note that in the first case in Theorem 3.1, α = 1, β = 0 and γ = 0. In the
second case, α = 0, β = 1 and γ = 2. In all other cases, α = 0, β = 0 and γ = 1.
Equation (3.1) is a basic relationship between a secret and its two shares. It is
used to develop an efficient secure comparison protocol in next subsection. Later in
section 4.5, I use this relationship to design an efficient secure division with public
divisor.
3.2.2 Secure Comparison
Suppose that we use the additive secret-sharing scheme based on homomorphic en-
cryption to design secure two-party protocols. We assume that Alice has the private
key and both Alice and Bob know the public key. Now suppose that two secrets
0 ≤ x, y < 2L are split between Alice and Bob, x = xA + xB (mod N), y = yA + yB
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(mod N). Alice and Bob wish to privately compare these two secrets. We assume
that the comparing result is that r = 1 if x ≤ y and r = 0 otherwise. Alice obtains
a share rA and Bob obtains a share rB such that r = rA + rB (mod N). Here we
assume that both x and y belong to a known interval [0, 2L) and have a maximum bit
length of L. The specification of this interval and the maximum bit length L depends
on the application and is agreed on by both parties. The bit length L is typically
much smaller than the security parameter K. We also assume that x, y < N/3, as I
discuss in last subsection. Because N is typically a large number, this assumption is
easily satisfied in real applications.
Now let z = y−x, zA = (yA−xA) mod N and zB = (yB−xB) mod N . We have
z = zA + zB (mod N). Note that z ∈ (−N/3, N/3). By Theorem 3.1, if we consider
the ranges of zA, zB, we have:
(i) If zA, zB ∈ [0, N/3), then z = zA + zB, so z ≥ 0 and x ≤ y.
(ii) If zA, zB ∈ [2N/3, N), then z = zA + zB − 2N , so −2N/3 ≤ z < 0 and x > y.
We can determine the order of x and y directly in these two cases. In all other
cases, we know that z = zA + zB − N . Note that −2L < z < 2L as we assume
that 0 ≤ x, y < 2L. If z ≥ 0, then the (L + 1)-th bit of 2K + z is 0; and it is 1
if z < 0. This is true as long as L < K holds. For example, let K = 10, L = 4,
then 210 + 3 = 10000000011 and 210 − 3 = 0111111111101. So to determine whether
0 ≤ z or not, we only need to compute the (L + 1)-th bit of 2K + z. Note that
2K + z = zA + zB + 2
K −N .
Putting all things together, I present an efficient secure comparison protocol in
Protocol 3.1. In the protocol, the comparison result r is a secret split between Alice
and Bob. Alice and Bob obtain their respective shares of r but neither of them knows
the secret r. This protocol will be used as a building block to design other secure
protocols.
In Protocol 3.1, α = 1 if and only if zA, zB ∈ [0, N/3). In this case, we have x ≤ y.
β = 1 if and only if zA, zB ∈ [2N/3, N). In this case, we have x > y. Lines 9-16
consider the case when z = zA + zB −N and compute the (L+ 1)-th bit of (2K + z).
Lines 11-16 perform the usual binary addition of p and q:
pL+1pL . . . p1
+ qL+1qL . . . q1

d = dL+1dL . . . d1
ci is the i-th carry-over bit and di is the i-th bit of d = p + q. Line 14 says that if
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Protocol 3.1 Secure comparison
Input: two secret integers x and y such that 0 ≤ x, y < 2L are split between Alice
and Bob, x = xA + xB (mod N), y = yA + yB (mod N).
Output: Alice and Bob obtain their respective shares of the comparison result r
such that r = 1 if x ≤ y and 0 otherwise.
1: Alice: zA = (yA − xA) mod N .
2: Bob: zB = (yB − xB) mod N .
3: Alice: α1 = 1 if zA < N/3 and α1 = 0 otherwise.
4: Bob: α2 = 1 if zB < N/3 and α2 = 0 otherwise.
5: Alice and Bob use secure multiplication (Protocol 2.1) to privately compute α =
α1α2.
6: Alice: β1 = 1 if 2N/3 ≤ zA and β1 = 0 otherwise.
7: Bob: β2 = 1 if 2N/3 ≤ zB and β2 = 0 otherwise.
8: Alice and Bob use secure multiplication to privately compute β = β1β2.
9: Alice: let p = pL+1pL . . . p1 be the lowest L+ 1 bits of zA.
10: Bob: let q = qL+1qL . . . q1 be the lowest L+ 1 bits of zB + 2
K −N .
11: c0 = 0
12: Alice and Bob use secure multiplication to privately compute the following loop
13: for i = 1 to L+ 1 do
14: ci = pici−1 + qi(pi + ci−1 − pici−1 − pici−1)
15: di = pi + qi + ci−1 − ci − ci
16: end for
17: Alice and Bob use secure multiplication to privately compute
r = 1− β − (1− α)(1− β)dL+1.
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at least two of pi, qi and ci−1 are 1, ci is 1; otherwise, ci is 0. Note that we need 2
multiplications to compute each ci. dL+1 is the (L+1)-th bit of (2
K +z). If dL+1 = 0,
then x ≤ y; otherwise x > y.
Line 17 combines all three cases and it can be interpreted as follows. If β = 1,
which means x > y, so r = 0. Otherwise, β = 0 and r = 1 − (1 − α)dL+1. If α = 1,
we know that x ≤ y, so r = 1; otherwise α = 0, we have r = 1− dL+1.
Consider the following trivial example. Let N = 143, K = 8, L = 4, x = 5, xA =
70, xB = 78, y = 2, yA = 33, yB = 112. Then zA = (33 − 70) mod 143 = 106,
zB = (112 − 78) mod 143 = 34. In this case, α = 0 and β = 0. Now p = 01010,
q = 10011 because 106 = (1101010)2, 2
K − N + zB = 147 = (10010011)2. So
d = p+ q = 11101, and we have r = 1− d5 = 0.
Th implementation of Protocol 3.1 is based on the additive secret-sharing scheme.
In the implementation, all the variables α, β, ci, di and r are secrets split between Alice
and Bob. Note that Protocol 3.1 involves only addition/subtraction and multiplica-
tion. Secure addition in the additive secret-sharing scheme is trivial. In the protocol
of secure multiplication, both the input and the output are secrets split between Alice
and Bob. We can use secure multiplication to implement Protocol 3.1. Protocol 3.1
needs 2L+O(1) invocations of secure multiplication.
As an example, I show how to implement line 17. We have inputs α = αA +
αB (mod N), β = βA + βB (mod N) and dL+1 = d
A
L+1 + d
B
L+1 (mod N) before the
execution of line 16. Alice first computes uA = (1 − βA) mod N and vA = (1 −
αA) mod N ; and Bob computes uB = (−βB) mod N and vB = (−αB) mod N . Then
uA and uB, vA and vB, wA are shares of u = 1 − β and v = 1 − α, respectively.
Alice and Bob invoke secure multiplication on (uA, vA) and (uB, vB) and obtain their
respective shares of s = uv. That is, Alice obtains a share sA and Bob obtains a share
sB such that s = sA + sB (mod N). Now Alice and Bob invoke secure multiplication
on (sA, d
A
L+1 and (sB, d
B
L+1) and obtain their respective shares of t = sdL+1. Alice
computes rA = (uA − tA) mod N and Bob computes rB = (uB − tB) mod N . Then
rA and rB ares shares of the desired comparison result r.
In the implementation of the secure comparison protocol, we can use the following
three precomputation techniques. They can reduce the running time drastically.
(1) In the secure multiplications of α = α1α2, β = β1β2 and pici−1, Alice needs
to encrypt α1, β1 and pi and sends them to Bob. Note that α1, β1 and pi are either
0 or 1 and they are held by Alice. Alice can compute a series of encryptions of 0
and 1 beforehand. During the execution of the protocol, Alice picks up the encrypted
numbers accordingly (Yang et al., 2006).
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(2) In secure multiplication, Bob needs to select and encrypt a random number.
These random numbers and their encryptions are independent of the execution of
secure protocols. So Bob can do these beforehand.
(3) In the Paillier cryptosystem, we encrypt a plaintext x as gxrN mod N , where
(N, g) is the encryption key and r is a random number in Z∗N . Note that r
N is
independent of the execution of secure protocols. We can compute a large number
of numbers rN beforehand and use them when needed in the execution of secure
protocols (Paillier, 1999).
3.3 Previous Work
Secure comparison is a fundamental problem in secure computation and privacy pre-
serving data mining. In his seminal paper on secure computation (Yao, 1982), Yao
proposed the Millionaires' problem, in which two millionaires wish to know who is
richer but without revealing their asset values. The original solution is exponential
in time and space. Several efficient protocols have been proposed and they focus on
the case when each party knows one number (Lin et al., 2005). The new secure com-
parison protocol presented in the previous section assumes that we use the additive
secret-sharing scheme based on homomorphic encryption and that the numbers are
secrets split between two parties. The adoption of homomorphic encryption enables
efficient implementation of secure multiplication, which is a basic and almost indis-
pensable operation in the design of privacy preserving data mining protocols. The
new protocol assumes that both the input numbers and the output result are secrets
split between two parties, so that it can be used as a subprotocol in other privacy
preserving data mining protocols.
Bunn et al. (2007) proposed a secure comparison protocol based on homomorphic
encryption in the development of their secure k-means protocol. Their comparison
protocol assumes that two secrets x, y ∈ [0, 2L) are split between two parties and the
comparison result is that r = 0 if x < y, r = 1 if x > y, and r takes 0 or 1 randomly
when x = y. The result r is also a secret split between Alice and Bob.
Bunn et al. first proposed a secure protocol to privately transform a secret x into
its binary representation. It is assumed that the secret x ∈ [0, N/2) and x ∈ [0, 2L).
If we let α = 0 if xA, xB ∈ [0, N/2) and α = 1 otherwise, then x = xA + xB − αN .
Let xALx
A
L−1 . . . x
A
1 and x
B
Lx
B
L−1 . . . x
B
1 be the lowest L bits of xA and xB, respectively,
and p = pLpL−1 . . . p1 be the lowest L bits of 2K −N . Then the binary representation
of x is computed as the following:
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xALx
A
L−1 . . . x
A
1
xBLx
B
L−1 . . . x
B
1
+α ∗ (pLpL−1 . . . p1)

x = xLxL−1 . . . x1
The authors didn't give the exact details of how to compute the above formula.
One possible way is to lines 11-16 in Protocol 3.1 to perform binary addition twice
and it takes 4L + O(1) secure multiplications. I present the secure transformation
protocol in Protocol 3.2. In the protocol, β = 1− α.
Protocol 3.2 Secure transformation protocol
Input: a secret integer x such that 0 ≤ x < 2L and 0 ≤ x < N/2 is split between
Alice and Bob, x = xA + xB (mod N).
Output: the binary representation of x, x = xL . . . x1, whose bits xi are secrets split
between Alice and Bob.
1: Alice: β1 = 1 if zA < N/2 and β1 = 0 otherwise.
2: Bob: β2 = 1 if zB < N/2 and β2 = 0 otherwise.
3: Alice and Bob use secure multiplication (Protocol 2.1) to securely compute β =
β1β2. Alice obtains αA and Bob obtains βB such that β = βA + βB (mod N).
4: Alice: let p = pL . . . p1 be the lowest L bits of xA.
5: Bob: let q = qL . . . q1 be the lowest L bits of xB.
6: c0 = 0
7: for i = 1 to L do
8: ci = pici−1 + qi(pi + ci−1 − pici−1 − pici−1)
9: di = pi + qi + ci−1 − ci − ci
10: end for
11: for i = 1 to L do
12: if the i-th bit of (2K −N) is 1 then
13: si = 1− β
14: else
15: si = 0
16: end if
17: end for
18: c0 = 0
19: for i = 1 to L do
20: ci = dici−1 + si(di + ci−1 − dici−1 − dici−1)
21: xi = di + si + ci−1 − ci − ci
22: end for
Lines 4-10 computes dL . . . d1, the binary representation of d = xA + xB. Lines
11-17 computes the binary representation of α(2K−N). Note that both parties know
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2K −N . In line 12, if the i-th bit of (2K −N) is 1, Alice sets si,A = (1− βA) mod N
and Bob sets si,B = (−βB) mod N ; Otherwise, Alice and Bob set their shares of si as
0. s = sL . . . r1 is the binary representation of α(2
K −N). Lines 18-22 compute the
binary representation of x = d+ s.
Alternatively, we can compute the binary representation of xA + xB, denoted
by uLuL−1 . . . u1, using lines 4-10; we then compute the binary representation of
xA+xB +2
K−N , denoted by vLvL−1 . . . v1, using lines 4-10 with xB replaced by xB +
2K −N . Then the i-th bit of x is then (1−α)ui +αvi. When we use precomputation
techniques as we discuss in the previous subsection, this implementation may be more
efficient because in line 8, pi and qi are numbers known by one party and the secure
multiplication can be simplified, while in line 20, both di and ci are secrets.
After transforming x and y into their binary representations, x = xL . . . x1 and
y = yL . . . y1, Bunn et.al used the following formula to compare x and y:
r =(xL ⊕ yL)xL + (xL ⊕ yL ⊕ 1)(xL−1 ⊕ yL−1)xL−1
+ (xL ⊕ yL ⊕ 1)(xL−1 ⊕ yL−1 ⊕ 1)(xL−2 ⊕ yL−2)
∗ xL−2 + · · ·+ (xL ⊕ yL)...(x2 ⊕ y2 ⊕ 1)(x1 ⊕ y1)
+ (xL ⊕ yL ⊕ 1) . . . (x1 ⊕ y1 ⊕ 1)t,
where t takes 0 or 1 randomly and ⊕ is the XOR operation. Note that a ⊕ b =
a + b − 2ab. This formula needs 4L + O(1) invocations of secure multiplication. So
the secure comparison protocol takes 12L+O(1) secure multiplications totally.
Qi et al. (2008) proposed another secure protocol for comparison when Alice holds
x and Bob holds y. Let cj (dj) be 1 if the integer with binary representation xj..x1 is
greater (smaller) than the integer with binary representation yj...y1. They used the
following formula to compute cL and dL, If j = 1 then
cj = xj(1− yj), dj = yj(1− xj),
If j > 1 then
cj = (1− dj−1)(cj−1 + (1− cj−1xj(1− yj)))dj
= (1− cj−1)(dj−1 + (1− dj−1yj(1− xj))).
The above formula needs 6L + O(1) multiplications. When the secrets x and y
are split between Alice and Bob, we need to first transform them into their binary
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representations. So the secure comparison protocol takes 14L+O(1) secure multipli-
cations.
The three secure comparison protocols discussed so far are all based on homomor-
phic encryption. S. From (2006) proposed a secure multi-party comparison protocol
based on the Shamir's polynomial secret-sharing scheme. Suppose that two integers
x, y ∈ [0, 2L) have binary representations x = xLxL−1 . . . x1 and y = yLyL1 . . . x1, re-
spectively. To compare x and y, we only need to compute (L+1)-th bit of 2L+x−y.
It is 1 if y ≤ x and 0 otherwise. This can be computed by usual binary additions.
When the polynomials are defined on the Galois field GF (28), which has character 2,
S. From (2006) used the following formula to compute the i-th carry-over bit
ci = xiyi + ci−1(xi + yi),
which requires 2L multiplications. When the polynomials are defined over any prime
field Zp, S. From used the following formula:
ci = xiyi + xici−1 + yici−1 − 2xiyici−1,
which requires 4L multiplications. As the formula in line 14 in Protocol 3.1 shows,
this can be achieved with only 2L multiplications.
Nishide et al. (2007) proposed secure comparison protocols based on the Shamir's
secret-sharing scheme. Their method is derived from interval testing. In their paper
the polynomials are defined over some large field Zp (p is a prime number) so that
all the considered integers are in Zp. In contrast, S. From used polynomials over the
small field GF (28) to represent secrets of single bits.
Note that both in the additive secret-sharing scheme based on homomorphic en-
cryption and in the Shamir's polynomial secret-sharing scheme, the secure comparison
protocols presented here are all implemented using secure multiplication. However,
the implementations of secure multiplication in these two schemes are different. In
the additive secret-sharing scheme, the implementation of secure multiplication is
based on the homomorphic property of cryptosystems; in the Shamir's secret-sharing
scheme, secure multiplication is implemented via multiplication of polynomials. Note
that in the Shamir's sharing scheme, secure multiplication and hence secure compar-
ison don't work in two-party cases. In contrast, the additive secret-sharing scheme
can be used in two-party cases.
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3.4 Privacy Preserving K-means Clustering
Bunn et al. (2007) proposed a privacy-preserving two-party k-means clustering proto-
col based on homomorphic encryption, The k-means protocol uses secure comparison
as a subprotocol. To demonstrate the efficiency of the new secure comparison proto-
col, I implement a privacy preserving k-means clustering protocol based on the work
by Bunn et al. I present the protocol in this section.
3.4.1 K-means
K-means clustering is one of the most widely used clustering techniques. Suppose
that we have a dataset X = (x1, . . . , xn)
T of n observation with p attributes. We
wish to cluster these observations into k groups, C = {C1, . . . , Ck}, such that the
observations in the same group are similar to each other. Let µj ∈ Rp be the center
(means) of the cluster Cj. The k-means method aims to find a clustering of the
dataset X which minimizes the error function E =
∑k
j=1
∑
x∈Cj‖x− µj‖22.
The k-means algorithm is an iterative method for data clustering. Initially, it
selects k cluster centers in some manner. Then it alternates with two steps: assigns
each observation to the cluster with the closest center and then computes the new
cluster centers accordingly. I present the k-means clustering algorithm in Algorithm
3.3, in which µj denotes the current center of the j-th cluster and νj denotes the new
center.
Algorithm 3.3 K-means clustering
Input: a datasetX = (x1, . . . , xn) of n observations with p attributes and the number
of clusters k.
Output: a clustering of n observations into k groups Cj (j = 1, ..., k).
1: initialize the k means ν1, ..., νk.
2: repeat
3: µj = νj for j = 1, 2, ..., k
4: for each observation xi do
5: assign xi to cluster j such that ‖xi−µj‖22 is the minimum over all j = 1, . . . , k.
6: end for
7: compute the new cluster centers νj for j = 1, 2, ..., k.
8: until convergence
The initialization of the cluster centers is an important issue. It determines the
final solution and affects the speed of convergence. We can select the initial centers
randomly, or we can apply the k-means algorithm on a small sample of the dataset
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and use the results as the initial centers to cluster the whole dataset (Bradley et al.,
1996). The stopping criterion is that the difference between νj and µj is sufficiently
small, that is,
∑k
j=1‖νj − µj‖22 <  for some predefined threshold . Here we use the
squared distance ‖νj − µj‖22 instead of the distance ‖νj − µj‖2 to avoid square root
operation.
3.4.2 Privacy Preserving Two-Party K-means
Consider a dataset X = (x1, ..., xn)
T consisting of n observations with p attributes.
Here we represent each observation as a column vector. We assume that all the
attribute values are integers. For a dataset with real numbers, we represent each real
number r with br2P c, where P is the number of bits to represent the fractional parts
of real numbers.
Now suppose that the dataset X is vertically partitioned between Alice and Bob.
Alice has the first p1 attributes and Bob has the last p2 attributes (p1 + p2 = p).
We denote the set of integers by Z. For each observation xi, x
T
i = (x
T
i,1, x
T
i,2), where
xi,1 ∈ Zp1 is the values of the first p1 attributes and held by Alice, xi,2 ∈ Zp2 is the
values of the last p2 attributes and held by Bob. Alice and Bob wish to apply the k-
means algorithm to cluster their joint dataset X into k groups but without disclosing
their confidential data.
I now present a secure two-party k-means clustering protocol using the additive
secret-sharing scheme based on homomorphic encryption. We assume that the plain-
text domain of the underlying cryptosystem is ZN = {0, . . . , N − 1} and Alice has
the private key. As I discuss in section 3.2, a nonnegative integer m is represented as
m in ZN and a negative integer m is represented as N +m in ZN .
I first present a secure protocol to compute the squared distance between two
points. Suppose that two vectors x = (x1, . . . , xp)
T and y = (y1, . . . , yp)
T are split
between Alice and Bob, xi = xi,A + xi,B (mod N) and yi = yi,A + yi,B (mod N)
(i = 1, . . . , p). Alice and Bob wish to privately compute s = ‖x − y‖22 and obtain
their respective shares of s. Let z = x − y, then the two shares of zi are zi,A =
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(xi,A − yi,A) mod N and zi,B = (xi,B − yi,B) mod N . Note that
‖x− y‖22 = ‖z‖22
= 〈z, z〉
= 〈zA + zB, zA + zB〉
= 〈zA, zA〉+ 〈zB, zB〉+ 2〈zA, zB〉
=
p∏
i=1
z2i,A +
p∏
i=1
z2i,B + 2
p∏
i=1
zi,Azi,B.
According to this formula, we can use secure multiplication to implement a secure
protocol to compute squared distances. I present this protocol in Protocol 3.4.
Protocol 3.4 Secure squared distance
Input: two vectors x = (x1, . . . , xp)
T and y = (y1, . . . , yp)
T are split between Alice
and Bob, xi = xi,A + xi,B (mod N) and yi = yi,A + yi,B (mod N).
Output: Alice and Bob obtain their respective shares of s = ‖x− y‖22.
1: Alice: zi,A = (xi,A − yi,A) mod N (i = 1, . . . , p).
2: Bob: zi,B = (xi,B − yi,B) mod N (i = 1, . . . , p).
3: Alice: sA = (
∏p
i=1 z
2
i,A) mod N .
4: Bob: sB = (
∏p
i=1 z
2
i,B) mod N .
5: for i = 1 to p do
6: Alice and Bob use Protocol 2.1 to compute r = zi,Azi,B.
Alice obtain her share rA and Bob obtain his share rB.
7: Alice: sA = (sA + rA + rA) mod N .
8: Bob: sB = (sB + rB + rB) mod N .
9: end for
To implement the privacy preserving k-means protocol, we need a secure division
protocol which privately computes the quotient when both the dividend and the di-
visor are secrets. Bunn et al. proposed a solution based on homomorphic encryption.
Suppose that both the dividend b and the divisor d belong to a known interval [0, 2L).
Their solution simulates the ordinary binary division to compute bb/dc. Let b0 = b.
We find the largest a1 ∈ [0, L) such that 2a1d ≤ b, which is represented as a character-
istic vector δ1 ∈ ZL such that the a1-th element in δ1 is 1 and all other elements are 0.
Let b1 = b0 − 2a1d. This procedure iterates for i = 1, 2, . . . , L. The quotient has the
binary representation δ =
∑L
i=1 δi. This protocol needs O(L
2) secure multiplications.
I now present the privacy preserving two-party k-means clustering protocol in
Protocol 3.5. In the protocol, µj, νj ∈ Zp denote the current and the new centers
of cluster j, respectively, and sj denotes the size of cluster j. The vector φ ∈ Zk
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indicates the assignment of an observation to the closest center. If xi is assigned to
cluster t, then φt = 1, and φj = 0 for j 6= t. The vector c ∈ Zn represents the
clustering of the n observations. If ci = t, it means that we assign the observation xi
to cluster t. In the implementation of the protocol, all the variables µ, ν, s, φ, c are
secrets split between Alice and Bob during each iteration. Only at the end of the
protocol, Alice and Bob exchange their shares of c to get the final clustering results.
The initialization of the cluster centers is an important issue in k-means clustering.
The original secure k-means algorithm by Bunn et al. (2007) privately selects the
initial centers according to some probability distribution (Ostrovksy et al., 2006).
In Protocol 3.5, for simplicity, Alice and bob simply initialize the cluster centers
randomly (lines 1 and 2).
Protocol 3.5 invokes Protocol 3.6 in line 10. Protocol 3.6 privately assigns each
point xi to the closest cluster. In Protocol 3.6, the variable φj in line 4 is the compari-
son result of dj and m. In line 5, the variable m is assigned the minimum of m and dj.
Lines 7-11 set φt = 1 if t is the closest cluster and φj = 0 for all j 6= t. For example,
suppose that we have a vector φ = (0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0) after the execution of line 6, then
we scan this vector from right to left. We don't change the first 1 we encounter and
set all the remaining entries to be 0. The vector φ becomes (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0).
The new cluster centers are computed privately in lines 18-20, Protocol 3.5. Al-
ice and Bob then use the secure squared distance protocol to compute privately∑k
j=1‖νj − µj‖22 and invoke secure comparison to check privately whether
∑k
j=1‖νj −
µj‖22 < . The comparison result is disclosed to both parties so that they can decide
whether to stop the loop or not. When they exist the loop, Alice and Bob exchange
their shares of c and both parties obtain the clustering results.
We can implement Protocol 3.5 and 3.6 using secure multiplication, secure squared
distances, secure comparison and secure division. It discloses only the number of
iterations. If we fix the number of iterations, the privacy preserving k-means protocol
is provably secure in the semi-honest model.
The privacy preserving two-party k-means presented here is based on the work
by Bunn et al. (2007). To test the performance of the privacy preserving k-means
protocol, I implement the protocol in C++ based on the Paillier system. My imple-
mentation is slightly different from the original protocol by Bunn et al. I summarize
the differences below.
1. The secure protocol by Bunn et al. privately selects the initial cluster centers
according to some probability distribution (Ostrovksy et al., 2006). In Protocol 3.5,
for simplicity, we select k observations randomly as the initial centers. For large
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Protocol 3.5 Privacy preserving two-party k-means clustering
Input: a dataset consisting of n observations with p attributes, X = (x1, . . . , xn)
T,
is vertically partitioned between Alice and Bob. Alice has the first p1 attributes
and Bob has the last p2 attributes. Both Alice and Bob know the number of
clusters k.
Output: Alice and Bob obtain a clustering of these n observations into k groups Cj
(j = 1, ..., k).
1: Alice randomly selects k indices from {0, . . . , n}, denoted by l1, . . . , lk,
and sends these indices to Bob.
2: Alice and Bob set νj = xlj (j = 1, ..., k).
3: repeat
4: for j = 1 to k do
5: µj = νj
6: νj = 0
7: sj = 0
8: end for
9: for each observation xi do
10: Alice and Bob invoke Protocol 3.6 (see below) to privately assign xi to the
closest cluster t. The result is a vector φ ∈ Rk such that φt = 1 and φj = 0
for j 6= t.
11: ci = 0
12: for j = 1 to k do
13: νj = νj + φjxi
14: sj = sj + φj
15: ci = ci + jφj
16: end for
17: end for
18: for j = 1 to k do
19: Alice and Bob invoke secure division to compute νj = νj/sj
20: end for
21: until
∑k
j=1‖νj − µj‖22 < 
22: Cj = {i|ci = j} (j = 1, ..., k)
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Protocol 3.6 Secure protocol to privately assign a point to the closest cluster
Input: an observation x ∈ Zp that vertically partitioned between Alice and Bob;
k clusters centers µj ∈ Zp (j = 1, . . . , k) that are split between Alice and Bob.
Output: φ ∈ Zk such that if x is closest to cluster t, then φt = 1 and φj = 0 for
j 6= t. φ are secrets split between Alice and Bob.
1: m =∞
2: for j = 1 to k do
3: Alice and Bob use Protocol 3.4 to securely compute dj = ‖x− µj‖22.
4: Alice and Bob use secure comparison (Protocol 3.1) to securely compare dj
with m. The result is that φj = 1 if dj ≤ min and 0 otherwise.
5: m = (1− φj)m+ φjdj
6: end for
7: δ = 1
8: for j = k downto 1 do
9: φj = δφj
10: δ = δ(1− φj)
11: end for
datasets, we first run the privacy preserving k-means protocol on a sample of the
dataset and use the results as the initial centers to cluster the whole dataset.
2. The original protocol by Bunn et al. uses a secure comparison protocol which
requires 12L+O(1) secure multiplications. I use the new secure comparison protocol
that needs 2L + O(1) secure multiplications. Secure comparison is a frequent and
costly operation in the privacy preserving k-means algorithm and it becomes the
bottleneck in the execution of the secure protocol. Experimental results presented in
next section show that the new secure comparison protocol improves the performance
of the privacy preserving k-means protocol substantially.
3. The k-means protocol by Bunn et al. uses a secure division protocol which
requires O(L2) secure multiplications. I implement a secure division protocol based
on homomorphic encryption using Newton's iterative method, which requires O(L)
secure multiplications. I present the secure division protocol in section 4.6 after I
discuss how to perform secure operations of real numbers. I use this secure division
protocol in the implementation of the privacy preserving k-means protocol.
3.5 Experimental Results
I have implemented secure comparison protocols and the privacy preserving two-party
k-means clustering protocol in C++ based on the Paillier cryptosystem (Paillier,
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1999). I used the GMP library (Torbjorn Granlund et al.) for big integers. I ran
the protocols on two computers both with Intel Pentium 4 CPU (3.2GHz) and the
Linux operating system. These computers are in a network connected by 100Mbps
Ethernet with average message latency less than 1ms.
I first compared the performances of the new secure comparison protocol with
those of Bunn et al. (2007) and Qi et al. (2008) without using precomputation
techniques. Table 3.1 reports the execution time when we use security parameter
K = 512. Table 3.2 reports the results with security parameter K = 1024. In
the tables, each column corresponds to the maximum bit length of the comparands.
Then I compared the performances of these secure comparison protocols using the
precomputation techniques that I present in section 3.2. I report the results in Table
3.3 and 3.4. The results show that the secure comparison protocol is several times
faster than the existing protocols.
Table 3.1: Execution time of secure comparison protocols (K = 512)
Maximum bit length L
Protocol 10 20 30 40 50
new 0.13s 0.34s 0.49s 0.63s 0.71s
Bunn et al. 3.63s 7.04s 10.45s 13.88s 20.88s
Qi et al. 4.62s 9.23s 13.86s 18.47s 23.26s
Table 3.2: Execution time of secure comparison protocols (K = 1024)
Maximum bit length L
Protocol 10 20 30 40 50
new 0.63s 1.17s 1.66s 2.20s 2.71s
Bunn et al. 5.17s 10.20s 15.20s 20.42s 25.47s
Qi et al. 6.17s 12.38s 18.64s 25.04s 31.27s
Table 3.3: Execution time of secure comparison protocols with precomputation (K =
512)
Maximum bit length L
Protocol 10 20 30 40 50
new 0.034s 0.054s 0.075s 0.098s 0.12s
Bunn et al. 0.44s 0.84s 1.26s 1.67s 2.07s
Qi et al. 0.55s 1.09s 1.65s 2.18s 2.73s
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Table 3.4: Execution time of secure comparison protocols with precomputation (K =
1024)
Maximum bit length L
Protocol 10 20 30 40 50
new 0.22s 0.34s 0.47s 0.60s 0.74s
Bunn et al. 2.76s 5.32s 8.01s 10.57s 13.10s
Qi et al. 3.48s 6.92s 10.41s 13.88s 17.27s
I tested the privacy preserving two-party k-means clustering protocol on 4 datasets
available in the UCI machine learning repository: Wisconsin Breast Cancer (WBC),
Glass Identification, Stalog Australian Credit Data and Wine (Frank and Asuncion).
These datasets are vertically partitioned between Alice and Bob. I describe the
datasets and their partitions in Table 3.5 in which n denotes the number of instances,
p is the number of attributes, and k is the number of clusters. Alice holds the first
p1 attributes and Bob holds the last p2 attributes. The observations in the Glass
dataset are classified into 6 groups. Here we consider two broad classes: window and
non-window.
In the following experiments I used security parameter K = 512 and set the
threshold in the stopping criterion as  = 2−10. When I apply the secure comparison
protocol, I assume that all the numbers belong to [0, 250) (L = 50).
Table 3.5: Benchmark datasets for k-means
Dataset n p p1 p2 k
WBC 699 9 5 4 2
Glass 214 9 5 4 2
Credit 690 14 7 7 2
Wine 178 13 7 6 3
I first tested the privacy preserving k-means protocol with different secure com-
parison protocols on small subsets of the WBC dataset. The subset of size n consists
of the first n observations from the WBC dataset. On these small subsets of ob-
servations, I chose the first 2 observations as the initial cluster centers. The results
are reported in Table 3.6. We can see that the privacy preserving k-means protocol
using the new secure comparison protocol is several times faster than using existing
comparison protocols. This verifies that secure comparison is the bottleneck in the
implementation of the privacy preserving k-means clustering protocol.
I then tested the privacy preserving k-means protocol on the WBC, Glass, Aus-
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Table 3.6: Execution time of privacy preserving k-means with different secure com-
parison protocols
Size
Protocol 60 90 120 150
new 72s 129s 133s 163s
Bunn et al. 540s 1010s 1072s 1339s
Qi et al. 699s 1301s 1385s 1703s
tralian Credit and Wine datasets. I normalized the Australian Credit and the Wine
dataset by dividing each attribute with its standard deviation. As we assume that the
datasets are vertically partitioned, each party holds all the data for his/her attributes
and can normalize them locally. I used the first k observations in the datasets as the
initial centers when I tested the Glass and Wine datasets. For the WBC and German
Credit datasets, I first ran the protocol on the first 120 observations in the datasets
and used the results as the initial cluster centers to cluster the whole datasets. I
report the running time and clustering accuracies of the privacy preserving k-means
protocol in Table 3.7. All these datasets contain class labels for their observations.
The clustering accuracy is computed as the percentage of correctly clustered obser-
vations. I also report the clustering accuracies using the kmeans function in the
Matlab. We can see that the clustering accuracies of the privacy preserving k-means
protocol are similar to the Matlab kmeans function.
Table 3.7: Experimental results of privacy preserving k-means on benchmark datasets
Dataset
Measure WBC Glass Credit Wine
Running Time 862s 400s 1715s 831s
Secure Protocol Accuracy 95.99% 88.32% 84.20% 95.51%
kmeans (Matlab) Accuracy 95.99% 88.32% 84.06% 96.63%
The running time of secure comparison is determined by the maximum bit length
of the comparands L. To see how the assumption of the maximum bit length affects
the overall running time of the privacy preserving k-means clustering protocol, I
tested the privacy preserving k-means protocol on the WBC and Glass dataset with
different assumptions of the maximum bit length. The results are reported in Figure
3.1 and Figure 3.2, which show that the overall running time of the privacy preserving
k-means protocol grows linearly with the maximum bit length.
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Figure 3.1: Scalability of privacy pre-
serving k-means with respect to the
maximum bit length of the comparands
(WBC)
Figure 3.2: Scalability of privacy pre-
serving k-means with respect to the
maximum bit length of the comparands
(Glass)
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Chapter 4
Privacy Preserving Multiple Linear
Regression
4.1 Introduction
Multiple linear regression is an approach to model the relationship between a response
variable and a set of explanatory variables. It assumes that the response variable
depends linearly on the explanatory variables and aims to find the linear predictor
function. Multiple linear regression is one of the most successful tools in statistical
analysis and has wide applications in many areas. For example, in finance, the well-
known capital asset pricing model uses linear regression to analyze and quantify the
systematic risk of investments; in economics, the predictions of consumption spending
and the demand for liquid assets are also based on linear regression models.
There are three typical computational methods to solve the problem of multiple
linear regression: solving normal equations, QR-decomposition and singular value
decomposition (SVD) (Seber, 2003; Demmel, 1997). Normal equations can be solved
using the Cholesky decomposition method. Solving normal equations is fastest and
least accurate. It is adequate when the condition number of the normal matrix is
small. QR-decomposition is the standard method and is employed in the software
packages such as Matlab, R and S-PLUS. The SVD method is the most accurate in
practice but is more expensive.
In many situations, the data to be analyzed are distributed among several parties.
For example, one party has a subset of explanatory variables and the other party has
the rest of explanatory variables and the response variable. If these parties cooperate
with each other and analyze the data jointly, they are able to achieve more accurate
statistical models. However, due to privacy concerns, the data holders may not be
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willing to disclose their confidential data. In such cases, it is necessary to develop
privacy preserving linear regression protocols which allow these parties to perform
linear regression jointly while protecting their data privacy.
Privacy preserving multiple linear regression has been studied in the literature. Du
et al. (2004) proposed secure matrix multiplication and secure matrix inverse proto-
cols, and hence designed privacy preserving linear regression protocols for vertically
partitioned datasets. Their method protects the data matrix by multiplying with
random matrices, which cannot provide theoretical guarantee about privacy. Hall
et al. (2011) presented secure linear regression protocols for arbitrarily partitioned
datasets based on homomorphic encryption. They designed a secure protocol to in-
vert a matrix, which they used to invert normal matrices and solve normal equations.
Sanil et al. (2004) proposed another privacy preserving linear regression protocol for
vertically partitioned datasets based on the Powell's iterative method. Their protocol
discloses aggregate information during each iteration.
I have developed privacy preserving multiple linear regression protocols based on
the QR-decomposition method. The protocols use the additive secret-sharing scheme
based on homomorphic encryption. In this chapter, I first present a two-party privacy
preserving linear regression protocol and prove that it is secure in the semi-honest
model. I then extend the two-party protocol to the multi-party cases.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 and section 4.3 in-
troduce multiple linear regression and the QR-decomposition method, respectively.
Section 4.4 discusses previous work on privacy preserving multiple linear regression.
Section 4.5 describes how to perform secure operations of real numbers and section
4.6 presents secure inverse square root, secure square root and secure division proto-
cols. Section 4.7 presents privacy preserving multiple linear regression protocols and
section 4.8 presents experimental results on benchmark datasets.
4.2 Multiple Linear Regression
In regression analysis, we are interested in studying how a variable, called the response
variable, depends on a set of variables called the explanatory variables. A linear
regression model assumes that the relationship between the response variable and
the explanatory variables is linear. The goal of linear regression analysis is to learn
this linear function from a training set, with which we can predict the value of the
response variable given the values of the explanatory variables.
Suppose that we have a training dataset consisting of n observations with p ex-
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planatory attributes and an additional response attribute,
X =

x11 x12 · · · x1p
x21 x22 · · · x2p
...
... · · · ...
xn1 xn2 · · · xnp
 ∈ Rn×p, Y =

y1
...
yn
 ∈ Rn,
where each row corresponds to an observation, each column in X corresponds to
an explanatory attribute and the vector Y corresponds to the response attribute.
The i-th observation consists of the values of the p explanatory attributes, xi =
(xi1, . . . , xip)
T ∈ Rp, and the corresponding response attribute value yi. The linear
regression model aims to find the coefficients
β =

β1
...
βp
 ∈ Rp
which best fit the linear relationship
Y = Xβ + , (4.1)
where
 =

1
...
n
 ∈ Rn
are error terms.
The regression analysis very often incorporates a constant factor in the model.
That is, it tries to find α ∈ R and β ∈ Rp that best fit the relationship
Y = α1 +Xβ + , (4.2)
where 1 is the vector of all 1s. This is equivalent that we add an additional explana-
tory attribute in the model 4.1 with fixed values 1s. Without loss of generality, we
focus on the model 4.1.
The least squares method estimates the regression coefficients β by minimizing
the residual sum of squares (RSS)
f(β) = (Xβ − Y )T(Xβ − Y ).
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The estimated coefficients β are the solution of the normal equation
(XTX)β = XTY, (4.3)
namely,
β = (XTX)−1XTY. (4.4)
Here we assume that X has full rank and XTX is symmetric and positive. Note
that in numerical computation, we typically don't use equation 4.4 to compute β
because inverting the normal matrix XTX is more expensive than solving the normal
equation itself. The normal equation can be solved using the Cholesky-decomposition
method. It is adequate when the condition number of the normal matrix XrmTX is
small. However, the normal matrix is often ill-conditioned and strongly influenced by
roundoff errors. Solving normal equations directly is not desirable in this case.
There are two stable methods to solve the multiple linear regression problem:
QR-decomposition and singular value decomposition (SVD). QR-decomposition is the
standard method and is employed in the software packages such as Matlab, R and
S-PLUS. The SVD method is the most accurate in practice but is more expensive. I
develop privacy preserving linear regression protocols based on the QR-decomposition
method and I will describe this method in detail in next section. See the classic text-
book (Seber, 2003) for details about linear regression and its computational methods.
4.3 QR-decomposition
Given an n× p matrix X, its QR-decomposition is a decomposition of the form
X = Q
(
R
0
)
, (4.5)
where Q is an n× n orthonormal matrix and R 1 is a p× p upper triangular matrix.
If we write Q = (Qp, Qn−p), where Qp is an n× p matrix and Qn−p is an n× (n− p)
matrix, then
X = QpR. (4.6)
Equation 4.6 is called the thin form of QR-decomposition and equation 4.5 is called
the fat form.
1In this chapter, R denotes both the upper triangular matrix in QR-decomposition and the set
of real numbers. Its meaning is clear from the context.
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Given the regression dataset X ∈ Rn×p and Y ∈ Rn, the regression coefficients
β are estimated according to equation 4.4. If we have the QR-decomposition of X,
then
β = (XTX)−1XTY
= ((QpR)
T(QpR))
−1(QpR)TY
= (RTR)−1RTQTp Y
= R−1rp,
(4.7)
where we let rp = Q
T
p Y . So the coefficients are the solution of the linear system
Rβ = rp.
QR-decomposition can be performed via the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization pro-
cess, the Householder transformation and the Givens transformation. They provide
similar computational accuracies. I develop privacy preserving regression protocols
based on the Householder transformation. I describe the Householder transformation
below.
To factorX into its fat form 4.5, the Householder transformation actually produces
QTX =
(
R
0
)
.
We write X = (c1, . . . , cp), where ci = (x1i, . . . , xni)
T. To transform X into the correct
form, we first convert the first column c1 into the correct form, that is, all the entries
in c1 except the first one are zeros. Let
θ = (−c11/|c11|)‖c1‖2,
where c11 is the first entry in c1, and
w = c1 − θe
where e = (1, 0, . . . , 0)T ∈ Rp. Also let
η =
√
2/‖w‖2,
v = ηw,
H1 = In − vvT,
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where In is the n × n identity matrix. The Householder matrix H1 is orthonormal
and symmetric. Then
H1X = (H1c1, . . . , H1cp).
It can be shown that the first column H1c1 is (θ, 0, . . . , 0). The i-th column H1ci is
computed as
H1ci = (I − vvT)ci
= ci − vTciv.
(4.8)
We write
H1X =

t11 t12 · · · t1p
0
...
0
X1
,

where X1 is an (n− 1)× (p− 1) matrix.
Similarly, let S2 be the Householder matrix chosen to convert the first column of
X1 into the correct form and let
H2 =

1 0 · · · 0
0
...
0
S2

Then
H2H1X =

t11 t12 · · · t1p
0 t22 · · · t2p
0
...
0
0
...
0
X2

.
Continuing on in this way, we are able to transform X into its correct form:
Hp . . . H1X =
(
R
0
)
.
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Let Q = H1 . . . Hp, then
X = Q
(
R
0
)
.
To compute rp = Q
T
p Y , we define r = Q
TY ∈ Rn and rn−p = QTn−pY , then
rT = (rTp , r
T
n−p). Note that r = Q
TY = Hp . . . H1Y and, similar to equation (4.8),
H1Y = (In − vvT)Y
= Y − vTY v.
The residual sum of squares is computed as
RSS = (Xβ − Y )T(Xβ − Y )
= (QpRβ − Y )T(QpRβ − Y )
= (Qprp − Y )T(Qprp − Y )
= rTpQ
T
pQprp − rTpQTp Y − Y TQprp + Y TY
= Y TY − rTp rp (4.9)
I summarize the procedure in Algorithm 4.1. The algorithm outputs R and rp,
which we use to compute the regression coefficients β. In the algorithm, I use Matlab-
like notations to denote matrices and vectors. For example, X[i, i] is the (i, i)-th entry
in X, X[i : n, i] is the sub-vector of the i-th column in X, and X[i : n, i : p] denotes
the sub-matrix of X. ei denotes the vector (1, 0, . . . , 0)
T of length n− i+ 1.
Algorithm 4.1 Householder transformation
Input: an n× p matrix X and an n-vector Y .
Output: the p × p upper triangular matrix R in the QR-decomposition of X, X =
QpR, and the p-vector rp = Q
T
p Y .
1: r = Y
2: for i = 1 to p do
3: θ = −X[i, i]/|X[i, i]| ∗ ‖X[i : n, i]‖2
4: w[i : n] = X[i : n, i]− θ ∗ ei
5: η =
√
2/‖w[i : n]‖2
6: v[i : n] = η ∗ w[i : n]
7: X[i : n, i : p] = X[i : n, i : p]− (v[i : n]T ∗X[i : n, i : p]) ∗ v[i : n]
8: r[i : n] = r[i : n]− (v[i : n]T ∗ r[i : n]) ∗ v[i : n]
9: end for
10: {R = X[1 : p, 1 : p], rp = r[1 : p]}
The linear system Rβ = rp can be solved using the back-substitution method, as
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presented in Algorithm 4.2.
Algorithm 4.2 Back-substitution algorithm for solving linear system of equations
Input: a p× p upper triangular matrix and a p-vector b.
Output: the solution of the linear system Rβ = b
1: for i = p downto 1 do
2: β[i] = b[i]/R[i, i]
3: b[1 : i− 1] = b[1 : i− 1]− β[i] ∗R[1 : i− 1, i]
4: end for
4.4 Previous Work
Du et al. (2004) considered the problem of privacy preserving multivariate statisti-
cal analysis, including linear regression and classification, over vertically partitioned
datasets. They proposed secure matrix multiplication and secure matrix inverse pro-
tocols which can be then used to design privacy preserving linear regression protocols.
Du et al. used algebraic techniques to design secure matrix multiplication and
secure matrix inverse protocols. Suppose that Alice has a p × n matrix S and Bob
has another n × q matrix T . Alice and Bob jointly generate an invertible n × n
matrix M . Let M = (Mleft,Mright), where Mleft,Mright are n × n/2 matrices, and
M−1 = (MTinv−top,M
T
inv−bottom)
T, where Minv−top,Minv−bottom are n/2 × n matrices.
Alice computes S1 = SMleft, S2 = SMright and sends S1 to Bob. Bob computes
T1 = Minv−topT , T2 = Minv−bottomT and sends T2 to Alice. Now Alice computes
VA = S2T2 and Bob computes VB = S1T1. It can be shown that VA + VB = ST .
When S and T are both square matrices, Alice and Bob can use the secure matrix
multiplication to privately compute (S+T )−1. Bob first chooses two random matrices
F and G. Alice and Bob use secure matrix multiplication to multiply S + T with F
and G and let Alice obtain the matrix F (S+T )G . The purpose of random matrices
F and G is to prevent Alice from learning the matrix S + T . Now Alice computes
W = G−1(S + T )−1F−1. Then Alice and Bob use secure matrix multiplication to
multiply W with F and G. The result is that Alice obtain VA and Bob obtain VB
such that VA + VB = (S + T )
−1.
The solution of the multiple linear regression is β = (XTX)−1XY . It is clear that
we can privately compute β using secure multiplication matrix and secure matrix
inverse protocols. Note that the matrix multiplication and matrix inverse protocols
try to protect matrices by multiplying them with random matrices. However, it is
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generally not a good idea to hide a number or matrix by multiplication because such
methods may leak information (Kiltz et al., 2005).
Hall et al. (2011) proposed secure multiple linear regression protocols for arbi-
trarily partitioned datasets based on homomorphic encryption. They noticed that
the inverse of a matrix S can be computed using the following coupled iteration:
Ut+1 = 2Ut − UtVt, U0 = c−1I
Vt+1 = 2Vt − V 2t , V0 = c−1S
where Vt = UtS and c is chosen by the user, for example, as the trace of S.
Based on these iterative formulas, Hall et al. developed secure protocols for linear
regression based on homomorphic encryption. Their protocols disclose the number of
iterations, which is related to the condition number of the covariance matrix XTX.
Sanil et al. (2004) considered the scenario where the explanatory attributes are
partitioned among m (m > 2) parties and the response attribute is known by all
parties. That is, all the parties know Y and the dataset X is vertically partitioned
among these parties, X = (X1, . . . , Xm), where the j-th party holds Xj. As we
know, the least squares method estimates the regression coefficients β by minimizing
the function f(β) = (Xβ − Y )T(Xβ − Y ). Sanil et al. noticed that the Powell's
iterative method can be used to minimize the quadratic function f(β). A basic step
in the Powell minimization process is to compute Xβ. If each party j knows the
regression coefficients corresponding to the attributes he/she holds, denoted by βj,
then each party j can compute Xjβj locally and all the participating parties can
use secure sum to jointly compute Xβ =
∑m
j=1Xjβj. Based on this idea, Sanil
et al. proposed a secure linear regression protocol. Their protocol doesn't employ
cryptographic techniques and can be implemented efficiently. However, each party
obtains aggregate information such as Xβ during each iteration. If we only want
to compute the regression coefficients β, the protocol will disclose more information
than necessary.
4.5 Representing Real Numbers in the Plaintext Do-
main
My research focuses on the design and implementation of privacy preserving dis-
tributed data mining protocols based on homomorphic encryption. The plaintext
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domain of the cryptosystem, denoted by ZN = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, is a set of natural
numbers. However, in data mining tasks, we deal mostly with real numbers, and we
need a way to represent them in the plaintext domain.
In section 3.2, I discuss how to represent a signed integer v in the plaintext domain
ZN . The integer v is represented in ZN as v if v ≥ 0 and as N + v if v < 0. To
represent a real number x in the plaintext domain ZN , we use the representation of
the signed integer bx2P c in ZN , where P is some positive integer. That is, if x ≥ 0,
it is represented in ZN as bx2P c; if x < 0, it is represented as N + bx2P c. Such
representation is similar to the way we represent real numbers in computers and P
is the number of bits we use to represent the fractional parts of real numbers and
determine the accuracy of the representations. We use the notation [x] to denote the
representation of a real number x in the plaintext domain. Hereafter, when we say
that an integer x is split between Alice and Bob, we mean that x = xA+xB (mod N).
When we say that a real number x is split between Alice and Bob, we mean that its
representation [x] is split between Alice and Bob, [x] = xA + xB (mod N), where
Alice holds the share xA and Bob holds the share xB.
We now consider secure addition and secure multiplication of real numbers. Sup-
pose that two real numbers, x and y, are split between Alice and Bob, [x] = xA + xB
(mod N), [y] = yA + yB (mod N). Alice and Bob wish to obtain their respective
shares of s = x + y and the shares of r = xy. The secure addition of x and y is just
the secure addition of [x] and [y]. Alice computes sA = (xA + yA) mod N and Bob
computes sB = (xB + yB) mod N , then sA and sB are shares of s = x+ y.
To privately compute r = xy, we first use secure multiplication of integers (Pro-
tocol 2.1) to multiply [x] and [y]. Note that [x] and [y] are the representations of the
signed integers bx2P c and by2P c, respectively. The secure multiplication of [x] and [y]
results in two shares of v = bx2P cby2P c. Note that [xy] = bxy2P c ≈ bx2P cby2P c/2P .
To obtain (the shares of) [xy], we need to divide v by 2P privately. Before I present
a secure division with public divisor protocol, I first prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that a secret signed integer v (|v| < N/3) is split between
Alice and Bob, v = vA + vB (mod N), and M is a public positive integer. Let α = 1
if vA, vB ∈ [0, N/3) and 0 otherwise, β = 1 if vA, vB ∈ [2N/3, N) and 0 otherwise,
γ = 1− α + β. Let
r = bvA/Mc+ bvB/Mc − γbN/Mc.
Then
|r − v/M | < 2.
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Proof. According to Corollary 3.2,
v = vA + vB − γN.
So
v/M = vA/M + vB/M − γN/M.
Let
vA/M = bvA/Mc+ 1
vB/M = bvB/Mc+ 2
N/M = bN/Mc+ 3
such that 1, 2, 3 ∈ [0, 1). Then
v/M = vA/M + vB/M − γN/M
= bvA/Mc+ 1 + bvB/Mc+ 2 − γ(bN/Mc+ 3)
= r + 1 + 2 − γ3
.
So
|r − v/M | = |1 + 2 − γ3|.
Note that 0 ≤ γ ≤ 2. We have
|1 + 2 − γ3| < 2,
namely,
|r − v/M | < 2.
Suppose that γA, γB are the shares of γ, γ = γA + γB (mod N). Then
r = bvA/Mc+ bvB/Mc − (γA + γB)bN/Mc (mod N)
= bvA/Mc − γAbN/Mc+ bvB/Mc − γBbN/M c (mod N)
If we let rA = (bvA/Mc−γAbN/Mc) mod N and rB = (bvB/Mc−γBbN/Mc) mod N ,
then rA and rB are the two shares of r. If v/M is sufficiently large, r is a good approx-
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imation of v/M . Based on this idea, I propose a secure division with public divisor
protocol (Protocol 4.3). We can implement Protocol 4.3 using secure multiplication
(Protocol 2.1). Note that this protocol only computes an approximation of v/M and
it is only useful when we know that v/M is sufficiently large.
Protocol 4.3 Secure division with public divisor
Input: a signed integer v is split between Alice and Bob, v =A +vB (mod N), and
a public positive integer M .
Output: Alice and Bob obtain their respective shares of r = v/M .
1: Alice: α1 = 1 if xA < N/3 and α1 = 0 otherwise;
2: Bob: α2 = 1 if xB < N/3 and α2 = 0 otherwise;
3: Alice and Bob use Protocol 2.1 to securely compute α = α1α2 and obtain the
shares αA and αB, respectively.
4: Alice: β1 = 1 if 2N/3 ≤ xA and β1 = 0 otherwise;
5: Bob: β2 = 1 if 2N/3 ≤ xB and β2 = 0 otherwise;
6: Alice and Bob use Protocol 2.1 to securely compute β = β1β2 and obtain the
shares βA and βB, respectively;
7: Alice: γA = (1− αA + βA) mod N ;
8: Bob: γB = (−αB + βB) mod N ;
9: Alice: rA = (bxA/Mc − γAbN/Mc) mod N ;
10: Bob: rB = (bxB/Mc − γBbN/Mc) mod N.
I continue to discuss the secure multiplication of two real numbers. After we
use secure multiplication of integers (Protocol 2.1) to multiple [x] and [y], we can
now use Protocol 4.3 to privately divide the product v = bx2P cby2P c by 2P . Note
that typically we tens of bits to represent the fractional parts of real numbers. The
difference between v/2P and r is negligible and r is a good approximation of [xy].
Some clarification is in order. The representation of a signed integer x in the
plaintext domain ZN is x if x ≥ 0 and N + x if x < 0, while the representation of a
real number x in ZN is bx2P c if x ≥ 0 and N + bx2P c if x < 0. Secure multiplication
of two integers x and y means that we use Protocol 2.1 to multiple x and y. When
we say secure multiplication of two real numbers x and y, we mean that we first use
Protocol 2.1 to multiply [x] and [y] and then use Protocol 4.3 to privately divide the
product by 2P . In some cases, we use Protocol 2.1 to multiple an integer x and the
representation of a real number y. The result is the (shares of) representation of the
real number xy.
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4.6 Subprotocols
In this section, I first propose new secure protocols for inverse square root and square
root operations. I then present the general secure division protocol.
4.6.1 Secure Inverse Square Root and Secure Square Root
Inverse square root 1/
√
x is a basic operation in data mining algorithms and statistical
analysis. For example, the correlation coefficient of two random variables u and v is
defined as ρuv = σuv/
√
σuσv, where σu, σv and σuv are the variances and covariance of
u and v, respectively. We want to design a secure protocol to privately compute 1/
√
x
when x is a secret real number split between two parties. For ease of presentation,
I first consider the case when x is an integer. Suppose that the integer x is split
between Alice and Bob, x = xA + xB (mod N). Alice and Bob wish to privately
compute z = 2M/
√
x, for some public integer M and obtain their respective shares
of z. I propose a secure inverse square root based on Newton's iterative method
(Kincaid, 2002). Let
f(z) = 22M/z2 − x.
Then 2M/
√
x is the zero of the function f(z). We can use Newton's iterative method
to find this zero:
zt+1 = zt − f(zt)/f ′(zt)
= zt(3 · 22M − xz2t )/22M+1.
Note that the operations involved in the iterative formula are multiplication, subtrac-
tion and division with constant divisor. We can compute this formula privately using
secure multiplication and secure division with public divisor.
One issue with the iterative method is that we need to choose a good initial point.
We assume that x belongs to a known interval (0, 2L). We find an integer B such that
22B ≤ x < 22(B+1) and the initial point can be chosen as 3/2 · 2M−B−1 = 3 · 2M−B−2.
Note that Newton's iterative method converges quadratically. If we execute T =
O(logM) iterations , it will compute a good approximation of 2M/
√
x.
I present the secure protocol of inverse square root in Protocol 4.4. Lines 1-5
compute the initial point z1. We first use Protocol 3.2 to securely transform x into
its binary representation x = xLxL−1 . . . x1 and then scan this binary string from the
lowest bits to the highest bits. If xi = 0, we don't change z1; otherwise, z1 is set to
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be 3/2 · 2M−(i+1)/2 = 3 · 2M−(i+1)/2−1. We then execute line 7 with a fixed number of
iterations. Clearly, we can implement Protocol 4.4 using secure multiplication and
secure division with public divisor.
In Protocol 4.4 we assume that x is an integer. When we consider a real num-
ber x and apply Protocol 4.4 on its representation [x] = bx2P c, then the result is
2M/
√bx2P c. Note that 2M/√bx2P c ≈ 2M−P/2/√x, so the result is the representa-
tion of the real number 2M−3P/2/
√
x. When we need to compute the representation
of the real number 2M/
√
x, we can replace M with M + 3P/2 in the protocol.
Protocol 4.4 Secure inverse square root
Input: a secret integer x ∈ (0, 2L) is split between Alice and Bob.
Output: Alice and Bob obtain their respective shares of z = 2M/
√
x.
1: Alice and Bob use Protocol 3.2 to securely transform x into it binary representa-
tion x = xLxL−1 . . . x1, whose bits xi are split between Alice and Bob.
2: z1 = 3 · 2M−1
3: for i = 1 to L do
4: z1 = (1− xi) · z1 + xi · 3 · 2M−(i+1)/2−1
5: end for
6: for t = 1 to T do
7: zt+1 = zt(3 · 22M − xz2t )/22M+1
8: end for
Noticing that
√
x = 1/
√
x · x, we are able to implement a secure protocol for the
square root operation, which I present below.
Protocol 4.5 Secure square root
Input: a secret integer x is split between Alice and Bob, x = xA + xB (mod N).
Output: Alice and Bob obtain their respective shares of
√
x.
1: Alice and Bob use Protocol 4.4 to privately compute y = 2M/
√
x for some suffi-
ciently large M and obtain their respective shares of y.
2: Alice and Bob use Protocol 2.1 to privately compute z = xy and obtain their
respective shares of z.
3: Alice and Bob use Protocol 4.3 to privately divide z by 2M . Alice and Bob return
the shares they obtain at this step.
In Protocol 4.5, M is chosen sufficiently large to provide sufficient accuracy. For
example, if we assume that x < 2L and we use P bits to represent the fractional parts
of real numbers, we can choose M = P + L. Protocol 4.5 privately computes the
square root of an integer. If we wish to compute the square root of a real number
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x, we can apply Protocol 4.5 on [x], the result is
√
[x] =
√bx2P c. We can securely
multiply it with 2P/2 to obtain the representation of the real number
√
x.
Both inverse square root and square root are basic operations in many data mining
and machine learning algorithms. Han et al. (2009) proposed secure protocols for
both operations in their design of a secure SVD protocol. In their solution, Alice first
selects a random r. Alice and Bob use secure multiplication to privately compute
t = rxB and obtain their respective shares of t. Alice sends rxA + tA to Bob. Bob
computes rx = rxA + tA + tB. Then Alice and Bob use secure multiplication to
compute
√
x = 1/
√
r · √rx. Kiltz et al. (2004) pointed out that it is not a good idea
to hide a secret by multiplication. We notice that if x is a small number as in most
applications, then Bob will be able to factor rx and guess the secret x.
4.6.2 Secure Division
Suppose that two secrets x and y are split between Alice and Bob; they wish to
privately compute z = y/x and obtain their respective shares of z. Note that y/x =
((2M/x) ·y)/2M . So we only need a secure protocol to compute 2M/x for some public
integer M .
Bunn et al. (2007) proposed a secure division protocol to compute by/xc based
on the general division procedure, which I present in section 3.4. Their protocol takes
O(L2) secure multiplications when x, y belong to a known interval [0, 2L). When L is
large, this protocol is not efficient.
S. From (2006) proposed a secure division protocol based on Newton's iterative
method. Let f(z) = 1/z − x/2M . Then 2M/x is the zero of f(z). This zero can be
computed using Newton's iterative formula:
zt+1 = zt(2
M+1 − ztx)/2M .
The initial point is chosen as z1 = 3/2 · 2M−B−1 = 3 · 2M−B−2 if 2B ≤ x < 2B+1. The
protocol is implemented using the Shamir's polynomial secret-sharing scheme, which
can guarantee privacy as long as the majority of the parties are honest. Note that
the protocols in the Shamir's secret-sharing scheme don't work in the two-party case.
It is easy to adapt the idea to implement a secure division protocol based on
homomorphic encryption, which I present in Protocol 4.6. We can implement Pro-
tocol 4.6 using secure multiplication, secure division with public divisor. This pro-
tocol computes an approximation of 2M/x. As Newton's iterative method converges
quadratically, we execute line 7 with a fixed number of iterations T = O(logM).
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Protocol 4.6 Secure division
Input: a secret integer x ∈ (0, 2L) is split between Alice and Bob,
x = xA + xB (mod N).
Output: Alice and Bob obtain their respective shares of z = 2M/x.
1: Alice and Bob use Protocol 3.2 to securely transform x into it binary representa-
tion x = xLxK−1 . . . x1, whose bits xi are split between Alice and Bob.
2: z1 = 3 · 2M−1
3: for i = 1 to L do
4: z1 = (1− xi) · z1 + xi · 3 · 2M−i−1
5: end for
6: for t = 1 to T do
7: zt+1 = zt(2
M+1 − xzt)/2M
8: end for
Protocol 4.6 securely computes 2M/x when x is an integer. If we apply Protocol
4.6 on the representation of a real number x, the result is 2M/[x]. Note that 2M/[x] =
2M/bx2P c ≈ 2M−P/x. So the result is the representation of 2M−2P/x. If we want to
privately compute the real number 2M/x, we simply replace M with M + 2P in the
protocol.
4.7 Privacy Preserving Multiple Linear Regression
In this section, I first present a privacy preserving two-party multiple linear regression
protocol for arbitrarily partitioned datasets. I prove that it is secure in the semi-honest
model. I then show how to extend it to the multi-party cases.
4.7.1 Two-Party Cases
The linear regression model aims to estimate the coefficients β given the training set
(X, Y ), where X ∈ Rn×p consists of n observations with p explanatory attributes
and Y ∈ Rn consists of n corresponding response attribute values. Now we suppose
that the regression dataset (X, Y ) is arbitrarily distributed between Alice and Bob,
X = X1 +X2 and Y = Y1 +Y2, where Alice holds X1 and Y1 and Bob holds X2 and Y2.
We assume that the attribute values held by Alice and Bob don't overlap. If one party
doesn't know a attribute value, he/she simply sets the corresponding entry in (Xi, Yi)
as 0. Although both Alice and Bob would like to know the regression coefficients
β, they are not willing to disclose their confidential data to each other. I use the
additive secret-sharing scheme based on homomorphic encryption to design a two-
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party privacy preserving multiple linear regression protocol, which allows Alice and
Bob to conduct multiple linear regression on the joint dataset (X, Y ) while protecting
the privacy of their individual data.
We consider a more general scenario whereX and Y are secrets split between Alice
and Bob, X = XA + XB (mod N), Y = YA + YB (mod N). This setting is useful
when some private preprocessing procedures such as variable selection are first applied
on the original dataset and then we perform privacy preserving linear regression on
the resulting secret dataset. It also provides a way to reduce multi-party protocols
to two-party protocols, which I present in next subsection.
The computation of the regression coefficients consists of two steps: the House-
holder transformation (Algorithm 4.1) and the back-substitution procedure (Algo-
rithm 4.2). We can design privacy preserving protocols for these two procedures
separately and then combine them to implement a privacy preserving multiple linear
regression protocol.
First consider the Householder transformation (Algorithm 4.1). In line 3, we need
to compute X[i, i]/|X[i, i]|, the sign of X[i, i]. If we define r = 1 iff X[i, i] ≤ 0
and 0 otherwise, the sign of X[i, i] equals 1 − 2r. So we use can secure compari-
son to compute X[i, i]/|X[i, i]|. Other operations involved in Algorithm 4.1 include
addition/subtraction, multiplication (line 3), scalar-vector multiplication (line 4, 8),
vector-matrix multiplication (line 7), scalar product (line 8), square root (line 3) and
inverse square root (line 5). Note that scalar-vector multiplication, vector-matrix
multiplication and scalar product can be computed using a series of multiplications.
So we can use secure multiplication, secure inverse square root, square root and secure
comparison to implement a privacy preserving two-party protocol for the Householder
transformation.
In the implementation of the secure protocol, all the variables are secrets split
between Alice and Bob, r = rA + rB (mod N), θ = θA + θB (mod N), w = wA +wB
(mod N), η = ηA+ηB (mod N), v = vA+vB (mod N), R = RA+RB (mod N). Note
that for all the subprotocols used here, both the inputs and the outputs are assumed
to be split between Alice and Bob and we are able to compose them sequentially
to implement a secure protocol for the Householder transformation. Remember that
when we need to securely multiply two real numbers, we first use Protocol 2.1 to
multiply their representations in the plaintext domain and then use Protocol 4.3 to
privately divide the product by 2P .
Similarly, we use secure multiplication and secure division to implement a privacy
preserving protocol for the back-substitution algorithm (Algorithm 4.2), in which
53
both the inputs R and b and the output β are secrets split between Alice and Bob.
We combine the secure protocols for the Householder transformation and the back-
substitution algorithm to implement a privacy preserving two-party multiple linear
regression protocol (Protocol 4.7).
Protocol 4.7 Privacy preserving two-party multiple linear regression protocol
Input: a regression dataset (X, Y ), where X ∈ Rn×p and Y ∈ Rn, is split between
Alice and Bob, X = X1 + X2 (mod N), Y = Y1 + Y2 (mod N). Alice has input
(1K , X1, Y1) and Bob has input (1
K , X2, Y2), where K is the security parameter.
Output: Both Alice and Bob obtain the regression coefficients β.
1: Alice generates a pair of keys (e, d) = G(1K) and sends the public key e to Bob.
2: Alice and Bob privately compute R ∈ Rp×p and rp ∈ Rp based on the Householder
transformation (Algorithm 4.1) and obtain their respective shares of R and rp.
3: Alice and Bob privately solve the linear system Rβ = rp based on the back-
substitution method (Algorithm 4.2) and obtain their respective shares of β.
4: Alice and Bob exchange their shares of β so both parties know the regression
coefficients β.
Theorem 4.2. Protocol 4.7 is secure in the semi-honest model.
Proof. To prove that the two-party privacy preserving multiple linear regression pro-
tocol is secure in the semi-honest model, we need to show that:
(1) Given Alice's input and output, we are able to simulate her view during the
execution of the protocol;
(2) Given Bob's input and output, we are able to simulate his view during the
execution of the protocol.
Note that we use secure multiplication, secure division, secure inverse square root
and secure square root to implement Protocol 4.7. All these subprotocols are im-
plemented using secure multiplication, so we actually implement Protocol 4.7 using
secure multiplication only.
We first examine the message exchanges during the execution of Protocol 4.7.
(1) At the beginning (step 1), Alice generates a pair of keys (e, d) = G(1K) and
sends the public key e to Bob. As usual, the modulus associated with this key pair
is denoted by N .
(2) During each invocation of secure multiplication, Alice sends two encrypted
messages to Bob and Bob sends the encryption of a random number to Alice. We
denote the total number of invocations of secure multiplication by v.
(3) At the last step (step 4), Alice and Bob exchange their shares of βi (i =
1, . . . , p). Alice sends βi,A to Bob and Bob sends βi,B to Alice.
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To simulate Alice's view during the execution of Protocol 4.7, we first check the
elements of Alice's view.
(1) Alice has input (1K , X1, Y1).
(2) Alice uses a sequence of random coins r1,A to generate the key pair (e, d) =
G(1k, r1,A). During the invocations of secure multiplication, Alice uses random num-
bers in Z∗N to encrypt messages. Denote by r2,A = (r2,1,A, . . . , r2,2v,A) the sequences
of random coins used to generate those random numbers. Denote all these sequences
of random coins by rA = (r1,A, r2,A).
(3) During each invocation of secure multiplication, Alice receives the encryption
of a random number from Bob. Denote all these messages by M1,A = (m1, . . . ,mv).
(4) Alice receives βi,B (i = 1, . . . , p) from Bob at step 4. Denote these messages
by M2,A = (β1,B, . . . , βp,B).
So Alice's view is V IEWA = (1
K , X1, Y1, rA,M1,A,M2,A). I now show how to
simulate Alice's view based on her input (1K , X1, Y1) and her output β. The simu-
lator generates a number of sequences of independent random coins r′1,A and r
′
2,A =
(r′2,1,A, . . . , r
′
2,2v,A), which correspond to the sequences r1,A, r2,A that Alice uses in the
real execution. Let r′A = (r
′
1,A, r
′
2,A). It is identically distributed with rA = (r1,A, r2,A).
The simulator generates (e′, d′) = G(1K , r′1,A), which is identically distributed with
(e, d). Denote the modulus associated with the key pair (e′, d′) by N ′.
I now show how to simulate the messages M1 = (m1, . . . ,mv). As I discuss in sec-
tion 2.3, each message mi Alice receives during the invocation of secure multiplication
is the encryption of a random number and is identically distributed with Ee(b1, b2),
where b1 is uniformly random in ZN and b2 is uniformly random in Z
∗
N . The simula-
tor generates a uniformly random number b′1 in ZN ′ and another uniformly random
number b′2 in Z
∗
N ′ and computes m
′
i = Ee′(b
′
1, b
′
2). m
′
i is identically distributed with
mi. Let M
′
1,A = (m
′
1, . . . ,m
′
v). M
′
1,A is identically distributed with M1,A.
I next show how to simulate the messages in M2 = (β1,B, . . . , βp,B). Before Alice
and Bob exchange their shares of βi, Alice has the share βi,A such that (βi,A+βi,B) mod
N = βi. βi,A is computed as βi,A = hi,A(1
K , X1, Y1, rA,M1,A) for some function
hi,A. The simulator computes β
′
i,A = hi,A(1
K , X1, Y1, r
′
A,M
′
1,A), which is identically
distributed with βi,A. Since the simulator is given the final result βi, it can compute
β′i,B = (βi−β′i,A) mod N ′, which is identically distributed with βi,B = (βi−βi,A) mod
N . Let M ′2,A = (β
′
1,B, . . . , β
′
p,B). It is identically distributed with M2,A.
Let M ′A = (1
K , X1, Y1, r
′
A,M
′
1,A,M
′
2,A). From the above discussion we know that
M ′A is identically distributed with Alice's view V IEWA and thus it is computationally
indistinguishable from V EIWA. So we can simulate Alice's view from her input
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(1K , X1, Y1) and her output β.
I now show how to simulate Bob's view during the execution of Protocol 4.7 from
Bob's input (1K , X2, Y2) and his output β. Bob's view is divided into five parts.
(1) Bob has input (1K , X2, Y2).
(2) During each invocation of secure multiplication, Bob uses a sequence of random
coins ri to generate a uniformly random number b1 in ZN and another uniformly
random number b2 in Z
∗
N and then computes Ee(b1, b2). Here b1 and b2 correspond to
r and s3 in Protocol 2.1, respectively. Denote these sequences of random coins by rB =
(r2,1,B, . . . , r2,v,B). Here v is the total number of invocations of secure multiplication.
We use the same subscript 2 here as we use in the simulation of Alice's view because
they are both used to simulate the invocations of secure multiplication.
(3) At the beginning (step 1), Bob receives the public key e from Alice.
(4) During each invocation of secure multiplication, Bob receives the encryptions
of two numbers from Alice. Bob receives altogether 2v messages during the v in-
vocations of secure multiplication. Denote the i-th message by mi = Ee(ai, r2,i,A),
where ai is some number only known by Alice and r2,i,A is the random coins Alice
uses to encrypt the message. Denote all these messages by M1,B = (m1, . . . ,m2v) =
(Ee(a1, r2,1,A), . . . , Ee(a2v, r2,2v,A)).
(5) At step 4, Bob receives βi,A (i = 1, . . . , p) from Alice. Denote these messages
by M2,B = (β1,A, . . . , βp,A).
So Bob' view is V IEWB = (1
K , X2, Y2, rB, e,M1,B,M2,B). I now show how to
simulate Bob's view based on his input (1k, X2, Y2) and his output β. The simulator
generates a number of sequences of independent random coins r′B = (r
′
2,1,B, . . . , r
′
2,v,B),
which correspond to the sequences of random coins rB = (r2,1,B, . . . , r2,v,B) that Bob
uses in the real execution. r′B and rB are identically distributed.
The simulator generates a pair of keys (e′, d′) = G(1K , r′1,A), where r
′
1,A is a se-
quence of independent random coins which the simulator generates to simulate r1,A
that Alice uses in the real execution. Because r′1,A is identically distributed with r1,A,
(e′, d′) is also identically distributed with the key pair (e, d) that Alice generates in
the real execution, and e′ is also identically distributed with e. Denote the modulus
associated with the key pair (e′, d′) by N ′.
I now show how to simulate the messagesM1,B = (Ee(a1, r2,1,A), . . . , Ee(a2v, r2,2v,A)).
The simulator computes M ′1,B = (Ee′(0, r
′
2,1,A), . . . , Ee′(0, r
′
2,2v,A)), where r
′
2,i,A is a
sequence of independent random coins which the simulate generates to simulate
r2,i,A. To show that M
′
1,B is computationally indistinguishable from M1,B, we de-
fine M ′′1,B = (Ee(0, r2,1,A), . . . , Ee(0, r2,2v,A)). Since e
′ and e are identically distributed
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and r′2,i,A is uniformly distributed in Z
∗
N ′ and r2,i,A is uniformly distributed in Z
∗
N ,
we know that (e,M ′′1,B) is identically distributed with (e
′,M ′1,B) and hence (e,M
′′
1,B)
is computationally indistinguishable from (e′,M ′1,B). Besides, because the Paillier
cryptosystem is semantically secure, (e,M ′′1,B) and (e,M1,B) are computationally in-
distinguishable. So (e′,M ′1,B) is also computationally indistinguishable from (e,M1,B).
To simulate the messages M2,B = (β1,A, . . . , βp,A), note that before Alice and Bob
exchange their shares of βi, Bob has the share βi,B such that (βi,A+βi,B) mod N = βi.
βi,B is computed as βi,B = hi,B(1
K , X2, Y2, rB, e,M1,B) for some function hi,B. The
simulator computes β′i,B = hi,B(1
K , X2, Y2, r
′
B, e
′,M ′1,B), which is indistinguishable
from βi,B. Since the simulator is given the final result βi, it can compute β
′
i,A =
(βi − β′i,B) mod N ′, which is indistinguishable from βi,A. Let M ′2,B = (β′1,A, . . . , β′p,A).
It is indistinguishable from M2,B.
Let M ′B = (1
K , X2, Y2, r
′
B, e
′,M ′1,B,M
′
2,B). From the above discussion we know
that M ′B is computationally indistinguishable from Bob's view V EIWB. So we can
simulate Bob's view using his inputs (1K , X2, Y2) and his output β.
4.7.2 Multi-Party Cases
We now consider the multi-party cases. Suppose that the regression dataset (X, Y ) is
distributed among m parties, X = X1 + · · ·+Xm and Y = Y1 + · · ·+Ym, where party
l holds (Xl, Yl). We assume that the attribute values held by different parties don't
overlap. If party l doesn't know a attribute value, he/she simply sets the correspond-
ing entry in (Xl, Yl) as 0. These m parties wish to conduct multiple linear regression
on the joint dataset (X, Y ) so that all of them obtain the regression coefficients β, but
they don't want to disclose their confidential data to each other. A secure multi-party
protocol is necessary to achieve this goal.
I present a multi-party privacy preserving multiple linear regression protocol in
Protocol 4.8. We assume that two parties, for example, party 1 and party 2, will
never collude and we reduce the multi-party protocol to the two-party case.
Note that after the execution of line 13, X = X1 +X2 (mod N) and Y = Y1 + Y2
(mod N). Protocol 4.8 invokes Protocol 4.7 and computes β correctly. Here we
assume that Party 1 and Party 2 never collude. The original definition of secure
multi-party computation (Definition 2.2) requires the collusion of any subset of parties
should not disclose any information except what can be inferred from their own inputs
and outputs. Protocol 4.8 is not secure according to definition 2.2 because if Party
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Protocol 4.8 Privacy preserving multi-party multiple linear regression protocol
Input: the regression dataset (X, Y ), where X ∈ Rn×p and Y ∈ Rn, is distributed
among m parties, X = X1 + · · · + Xm and Y = Y1 + · · · + Ym, Parties l holds
(1K , Xl, Yl), where K is the security parameter.
Output: All the parties obtain the regression coefficients β.
1: Party 1 generates a pair of keys (e, d) = G(1K) and sends the public key e to all
other parties.
2: for each party l 6= 1, 2 do
3: for each entry Xl[i, j] in Xl do
4: Party l selects a random number r in ZN .
5: Party l sends r to Party 1 and Party 1 sets X1[i, j] = (X1[i, j] + r) mod N .
6: Party l sends (Xl[i, j] − r) mod N to Party 2 and Party 2 sets X2[i, j] =
(X2[i, j] +Xl[i, j]− r) mod N .
7: end for
8: for each entry Yl[i] in Yl do
9: Party l selects a random number r in ZN .
10: Party l sends r to Party 1 and Party 1 sets Y1[i] = (Y1[i] + r) mod N .
11: Party l sends (Yl[i] − r) mod N to Party 2 and Party 2 sets Y2[i] = (Y2[i] +
Yl[i]− r) mod N .
12: end for
13: end for
14: Party 1 and Party 2 run Protocol 4.7 on (1K , X1, Y1) and (1
K , X2, Y2) and both
parties obtain the regression coefficients β.
15: Party 1 sends the regression coefficients β to all other parties.
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1 and Party 2 collude, they will know all the data. The definition of secure multi-
party computation can be modified to make the explicit assumption that two specific
parties never collude.
Definition 4.1. (Modified from (Goldreich, 2004)) Let f : ({0, 1}∗)m → ({0, 1}∗)m)
be anm-ary functionality where fi(x1, . . . , xm) denotes the i-th element of f(x1, . . . , xm).
For I = {i1, . . . , it} ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}, we let fI(x1, . . . , xm) denote the subsequence of
fii(x1, . . . , xm), . . . , fit(x1, . . . , xm). Let Π be an m-party protocol for computing f .
We assume that each party is supplied with a security parameter 1K besides his/her in-
put xi. Define the view of the i-th party during an execution of Π on x = (x1, . . . , xm)
as V IEWΠi (1
K , x) = (1K , xi, ri,m1, . . . ,msi), where ri represents the outcome of the
i-th party internal coin toss and mj represents the j-th message he/she has received.
For I = {i1, . . . , it}, let V IEWI(1K , x) = (I, V IEWi1(1K , x), . . . , V IEWit(1K , x)).
We say that Π privately computes f if there exists a probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm, denote by S, such that for every I ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} that doesn't include both
1 and 2, it holds that
(S(I, 1K , (x1, . . . , xi), fI(x)), f(x)) ' (V IEWI(1K , x),Π(x))
where Π(x) denotes the output sequence of all parties during the execution and '
means computational indistinguishability.
Theorem 4.3. Multi-party protocol 4.8 privately computes β according to definition
4.1.
Proof. Suppose that S is any subset of parties that doesn't include both party 1
and 2. For Party l ∈ S, if l 6= 1, 2, what he/she receives is the public key e and
the regression coefficients. We simply compute e′ = G1(1K) to simulate the message
e. If Party 1 is in the subset S, he/she receives a message for each entry in the
matrix X and the vector Y from each of the other parties at the beginning. These
message are just random numbers, so we can choose random numbers to simulate
them. After the execution of line 13, Party 1 has (X1, Y1) and Party 2 has (X2, Y2)
such that X = X1 + X2 (mod N) and Y = Y1 + Y2 (mod N). Then Party 1 and
Party 2 invoke Protocol 4.7 on (X1, Y1) and (X2, Y2). Because Protocol 4.7 is secure
in the semi-honest model, we can simulate those messages Party 1 receives during the
invocation of Protocol 4.7, based on his/her inputs X1 and Y1 and his/her output β.
So we can simulate all the messages Party 1 receives during the execution of Protocol
4.8. Similarly, if Party 2 is in S, we can simulate all the messages Party 2 receives
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during the execution of Protocol 4.8. So Protocol 4.8 privately computes β according
to Definition 4.1.
4.8 Experimental Results
The goal of this experimental analysis is to access the practicality and the accuracy
of the privacy preserving two-party multiple linear regression protocol. I have im-
plemented the protocol in C++ based on the Paillier cryptosystem and tested its
performance on benchmark datasets. I used the GMP libary (Torbjorn Granlund et
al.) for big integers. I ran the experimental study on two separating computers both
with Intel Pentium 4 CPU (3.2GHz) and the Linux operating system. These com-
puters are in a network connected by 100Mps Ethernet with average message latency
less 1ms. I
In Protocol 4.7, Alice generates a pair of keys for each running of the protocol. In
the experiments, the pair of keys were fixed so that I could use the precomputation
techniques presented in section 3.2. The key security parameter I used was K = 512.
I used benchmark datasets from the UCI machine learning repository (Frank and
Asuncion). Specifically, I used 5 datasets to test the privacy preserving linear regres-
sion protocol: Housing, Auto-mpg, Servo, Computer hardware and Slump datasets.
I assume that the datasets are vertically partitioned between Alice and Bob, each
running a computer. The execution time for other partitions are similar to vertical
partitions. I describe these datasets and their partitions in Table 4.1, in which n is
the number of observations and p is the number of explanatory attributes. Alice holds
the first p1 attributes and Bob holds the last p2 attributes. In addition, I used an
additional explanatory attribute with fixed values 1s to accommodate the constant
factor in the model 4.2 and assume that Alice holds this attribute. I assume that
the response attribute is held by Bob. The Slump dataset consists of 7 explanatory
attributes and 3 response attributes. I only report the regression results on the first
response attribute. The results on the other two response attributes are similar.
I tested the privacy preserving linear regression protocols on these 5 datasets. I
report the execution time in Table 4.2. I also implemented a Matlab program to
compute the regression coefficients based on the Householder transformation. The
running times of the Matlab program on all these 5 datasets are less than 0.1 second.
The regression coefficients computed by the secure protocol are the same as those
computed by the Matlab program.
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Table 4.1: Benchmark datasets for linear regression
Dataset n p p1 p2
Housing 506 13 6 7
Auto-mpg 392 7 3 4
Servo 167 4 2 2
Slump 103 7 3 4
Computer hardware 209 6 3 3
Table 4.2: Experimental results of privacy preserving linear regression on benchmark
datasets
Dataset Housing Auto-mpg Servo Slump Computer hardware
Running Time 625s 229s 75s 106s 126s
I then tested how the execution time scales with the number of observations in
the datasets. I report the results on the housing and auto-mpg datasets in Figure
4.1 and Figure 4.2. The dataset of size n consists of the first n observations in the
whole datasets. We observe that the running time scales linearly with the size of the
dataset.
Figure 4.1: Scalability of pri-
vacy preserving multiple linear
regression with respect to the
number of observations (Hous-
ing)
Figure 4.2: Scalability of pri-
vacy preserving multiple linear
regression with respect to the
number of observations (Auto-
mpg)
I then tested how the execution time scales with the number of attributes. I used
the Housing dataset. To observe the asymptotic behavior, I assembled two copies
of the Housing datasets into one which has 506 observations and 28 explanatory
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attributes. Note that the explanatory attributes in the new dataset are dependent.
The regression coefficients in this model may not be useful and the computation may
not be accurate. Now I used a subset of the generated dataset to test the asymptotic
behavior. The subset with p attributes consist of the first p explanatory attributes
and the additional response attribute. I assume that the explanatory attributes are
evenly distributed between Alice and Bob. I report the results in Figure 4.3.The line in
Figure 4.3 shows that the execution time is super-linear in the number of explanatory
attributes. The execution time is expected to exhibit quadratic asymptotic behavior
with larger numbers of attributes.
Figure 4.3: Scalability of privacy preserving multiple linear regression with respect
to the number of attributes (Housing)
As one of the conclusions, our experiments demonstrated that the proposed pri-
vacy preserving multiple linear regression protocol have practical potential. The cur-
rent proof-of-concept implementation allowed us to handle instances with hundreds
of observations and tens of attributes. However, new techniques are needed to design
practical protocols for larger datasets.
Copyright cOZhenmin Lin 2012
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Chapter 5
Privacy Preserving EM Clustering
5.1 Introduction
Expectation maximization (EM) is an iterative method for finding unknown pa-
rameters in statistical models which depend on unobserved latent variables. Since
Dempster, Laird, and Rubin published their classic paper on the EM algorithm in
1977, it has become a popular method in the AI and statistics communities. Partic-
ularly, the EM algorithm is frequently used for data clustering in data mining and
machine learning. EM clustering can often achieve better clustering performances
than other clustering methods such as k-means.
In many situations, the data to be clustered are distributed among several parties.
To achieve more accurate clustering results, these parties wish to use the EM algo-
rithm to cluster their joint dataset. However, due to privacy concerns, they may not
be willing to disclose their confidential data. In this chapter, we propose a privacy
preserving two-party EM clustering protocol which allows two parties to jointly per-
form EM clustering without disclosing their individual data. The protocol is based
on the additive secret-sharing scheme using homomorphic encryption. This protocol
works for arbitrarily partitioned datasets. and discloses only the number of iterations
besides the clustering results. The existing secure protocol on EM clustering consid-
ers only the scenario where the datasets are horizontally partitioned among multiple
parties (Lin et al., 2005) and it discloses the means and the covariance matrix, which
may contain sensitive information.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 introduces the EM
clustering method. Section 5.3 discusses previous work on privacy preserving EM
clustering. Section 5.4 presents two basic cryptographic building blocks, secure log-
arithm and secure exponential function. Section 5.5 presents the privacy preserving
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two-party EM clustering protocol and gives a formal proof about its security. Section
5.6 presents experimental results on benchmark datasets.
5.2 EM Clustering
Suppose that a statistical model consists of a set X = (x1, . . . , xn)
T of observed data,
a set of unobserved latent data Z = (z1, . . . , zn)
′, and a vector of unknown parameters
θ. We assume that zi are discrete random variables taking values from {1, . . . , k} and
the parameters θ are continuous. The observed data xi can be discrete or continuous.
Assume that the joint likelihood function of X and Z is
L(θ;X,Z) = p(X,Z|θ),
where p is the probability density function. Then the marginal likelihood function of
X is
L(θ;X) =
∑
Z
p(X,Z|θ) (5.1)
and the marginal log-likelihood function of X is
logL(θ;X) = log
∑
Z
p(X,Z|θ). (5.2)
We denote the conditional distribution of zi given xi and θ by
sij = p(zi = j|xi, θ).
The maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) method aims to find the parameters θ
which maximize the marginal likelihood function 5.1 or equivalently the marginal log-
likelihood function 5.2. This can be achieved by taking the derivative of the marginal
log-likelihood function. However, it is usually difficult and very often impossible to
obtain an analytical solution.
The EM algorithm is an iterative method to find the maximum likelihood esti-
mates of the unknown parameters θ. It alternates with two steps. In the E step,
we compute the conditional distribution of Z given X and the current estimates of
parameters θ(t),
s
(t)
ij = p(zi = j|xi; θ(t)),
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and construct a function
Q(θ, θ(t)) = EZ|X,θ(t)(logL(θ;X,Z)). (5.3)
This function is a lower bound of the marginal log-likelihood function logL(θ;X). In
the M step, we find the parameters θ which maximize Q(θ, θ(t)). It is often likely to
obtain an analytic solution to maximize equation 5.3. It can be proved that the EM
algorithm converges and finds a maxima of the marginal log-likelihood function. The
readers are referred to the textbook by Mclachlan and Krishnan (2008) for a detailed
account for the EM algorithm.
One of the important applications of the EM algorithm is data clustering. Sup-
pose that we have a sample of n independent observations from a mixture of k
multivariate normal distributions of dimension q, X = (x1, . . . , xn)
T. Let Z =
(z1, z2, . . . , zn)
T be the latent variables which determine the populations from which
these observations are generated. We assume that p(zi = j) = τj for j = 1, . . . , k.
That is, the percentage of these observations coming from the j-th population is τj.
We also assume that
xi|(zi = j) ∼ Nq(µj,Σj).
So the conditional distribution of xi given zi = j has density function
f(xi;µj,Σj) =
1√
(2pi)q|Σj|
exp(−1
2
(xi − µj)TΣ−1j (xi − µj)) (5.4)
where µj ∈ Rq is the mean vector of the j-th normal distribution and Σj ∈ Rq×q is
the covariance matrix.
In this model, the unknown parameters are
θ = (τ1, . . . , τk, µ1, . . . , µk,Σ1, . . . ,Σk),
which represent the means and covariances of the normal distributions and the "mix-
ing" values between them. Given these parameters θ, the conditional distribution
of zi given xi, sij = p(zi = j|xi, θ), is the probability that the point xi is generated
from the j-th population. To cluster these n observations into k groups, we can use
the EM algorithm to estimate the parameters θ and compute sij from the observed
data X. The values of sij provide a soft clustering of these observations. To obtain a
hard clustering, we assign each observation xi to cluster j such that sij is the largest
among all sil for l = 1, . . . , k.
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Note that in this model the likelihood function of X and Z is:
L(θ;X,Z) = p(X,Z|θ)
=
n∏
i=1
p(xi, zi|θ)
=
n∏
i=1
p(zi|θ)p(xi|zi; θ)
=
n∏
i=1
k∑
j=1
I(zi = j)p(zi = j|θ)p(xi|zi = j; θ)
=
n∏
i=1
k∑
j=1
I(zi = j)τjf(xi;µj,Σj)
(5.5)
where I is the indicator function and f is the density function of normal distribution
as defined in equation 5.4. The log-likelihood function is
logL(θ;X,Z) =
n∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
I(zi = j)[log τj − q
2
log(2pi)− 1
2
log |Σj| − 1
2
(xi − µj)TΣ−1j (xi − µj)].
(5.6)
The marginal likelihood function of X is
L(θ;X) =
∑
Z
L(θ;X,Z)
=
∑
Z
p(X,Z|θ)
=
∑
Z
n∏
i=1
p(xi, zi|θ)
=
n∏
i=1
k∑
j=1
p(xi, zi = j|θ)
=
n∏
i=1
k∑
j=1
p(zi = j|θ)p(xi|zi = j; θ)
=
n∏
i=1
k∑
j=1
τjf(xi;µj,Σj).
(5.7)
The marginal log-likelihood function of X is
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logL(θ;X) =
n∑
i=1
log
k∑
j=1
τjf(xi;µj,Σj)
=
n∑
i=1
log
k∑
j=1
τj
1√
(2pi)q|Σj|
exp(−1
2
(xi − µj)TΣ−1j (xi − µj))
(5.8)
We now use the EM algorithm to estimate the parameters θ, which we can use
to cluster the n observations X = (x1, . . . , xn)
T into k groups. In the E step, given
the current estimate of parameters
θ(t) = (τ
(t)
1 , . . . , τ
(t)
k , µ
(t)
1 , . . . , µ
(t)
k ,Σ
(t)
1 , . . . ,Σ
(t)
k ),
the conditional distribution zi given xi is computed using the Bayes' formula
s
(t)
ij = p(zi = j|xi; θ(t)) =
τ
(t)
j f(xi;µ
(t)
j ,Σ
(t)
j )∑k
l=1 τ
(t)
l f(xi;µ
(t)
l ,Σ
(t)
l )
. (5.9)
The corresponding Q function (defined in equation 5.3) is:
Q(θ, θ(t)) =
n∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
s
(t)
ij [log τj−
q
2
log(2pi)−1
2
log |Σj|−1
2
(xi−µj)TΣ−1j (xi−µj)] (5.10)
In the M step, we find the parameters θ which maximize Q(θ, θ(t)). The solutions
are:
τ
(t+1)
j =
1
n
n∑
i=1
s
(t)
ij (5.11)
µ
(t+1)
j =
∑n
i=1 s
(t)
ij xi∑n
i=1 s
(t)
ij
(5.12)
Σ
(t+1)
j =
∑n
i=1 s
(t)
ij (xi − µ(t+1)j )(xi − µ(t+1)j )T∑n
i=1 s
(t)
ij
(5.13)
The EM algorithm alternates with the E and M steps. In the implementation of
this algorithm, we first initialize sij, the conditional distribution of zi given xi. This
can be achieved by an initial clustering of these n observations into k groups. For
each observation i, we can set s
(1)
ij = 1 if we assign observation i to cluster j and
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set s
(1)
il = 0 for all l 6= j. We can perform the initial clustering in several ways. We
may assign each data point to a cluster randomly, or we may randomly choose k data
points as the initial cluster centers and assign each point to the closest center. We
may even run other clustering algorithms such as k-means on the dataset and use the
clustering results as the initial clustering of the EM algorithm.
The EM algorithm is used to maximize the marginal log-likelihood function. The
natural stopping criterion is to check whether the difference of the marginal log-
likelihoods between two successive iterations is sufficiently small, that is, to check
whether the following condition holds,
| logL(θ(t+1);X)− logL(θ(t);X)| <  (5.14)
where  is some predetermined threshold and logL(θ;X) is as defined in equation 5.8.
Alternatively, we can check the condition on the relative difference
| logL(θ
(t+1);X)− logL(θ(t);X)
L(θ(t+1);X)
| < . (5.15)
After the loop with the E and M steps terminates, we have the estimates of the
parameters θ. W can compute sij = p(zi|xi, θ), the conditional distribution of zi given
xi, according to equation 5.9. They provide a soft clustering of these n observations.
As a final step, we compute hard clustering results and assign each observation xi to
cluster j such that sij is the largest among all sil (l = 1, . . . , k).
The EM clustering algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 5.1.
Algorithm 5.1 EM clustering
Input: a dataset of n observations X = (x1, . . . , xn)
T ∈ Rn×q.
Output: cluster these n observations into k groups.
1: initialize the conditional distribution s
(1)
ij of zi given xi.
2: for t = 1 to MAX do
3: M step: compute τ
(t+1)
j , µ
(t+1)
j ,Σ
(t+1)
j as in equations (5.11),(5.12) and (5.13).
4: E step: compute s
(t+1)
ij as in equation (5.9).
5: compute the marginal log-likelihood logL(θ(t+1);X) as in equation (5.8).
6: if | logL(θ(t+1);X)/n− logL(θ(t);X)/n| <  then
7: break
8: end if
9: end for
10: compute the final clustering results.
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5.3 Previous Work
Lin et al. (2004) considered the scenario where the datasets are horizontally par-
titioned among multiple parties. Suppose that there are m (m > 2) parties which
jointly hold a dataset of n observations X = (x1, . . . , xn)
T. Each party h (1 ≤ h ≤ m)
owns nh observations (
∑m
h=1 nh = n). Lin et al. proposed a privacy preserving EM
clustering protocol which allows these m parties to securely perform EM clustering.
I briefly discuss their protocol below.
Note that in the M -step, the parameters are updated as in equations (5.11),
(5.12) and (5.13). To obtain global estimates τ
(t+1)
j , µ
(t+1)
j and Σ
(t+1)
j , we only need
the global values
∑n
i=1 s
(t)
ij ,
∑n
i=1 s
(t)
ij xi and
∑n
i=1 s
(t)
ij (xi − µ(t+1)j )(xi − µ(t+1)j )T. Let
xih (i = 1, . . . , nh) be the i-th observation held by party h and define
Ajh =
nh∑
i=1
s
(t)
ihj
Bjh =
nh∑
i=1
s
(t)
ihjxih
Cjh =
nh∑
i=1
s
(t)
ihj(xih − µ(t+1)j )(xih − µ(t+1)j )T.
Then we have
m∑
h=1
Ajh =
n∑
i=1
s
(t)
ij
m∑
h=1
Bjh =
n∑
i=1
s
(t)
ij xi
m∑
h=1
Cjh =
n∑
i=1
s
(t)
ij (xi − µ(t+1)j )(xi − µ(t+1)j )T.
Ajh, Bjh, Cjh can be computed locally by each party. To compute the global
estimates, we can invoke the following secure sum protocol. Suppose that each party
h owns a number vh and they wish to obtain the sum of these numbers without
disclosing their individual numbers to each other. We assume that their sum belong
to [0, N). The secure summation proceeds as follows. Party 1 selects a random
number r ∈ [0, N) and then sends w1 = r + v1 to party 2. Each party h adds its
number vh to the message it received and then sends it to the next party. Party m
sends wm = wm−1 + vm to party 1. Now party 1 computes wm − r, which equals
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∑m
h=1 vh, and sends this result to all other parties. Using this secure sum procedure,
each party h doesn't need to disclose Ajh, Bjh, Cjh and all the parties obtain the global
estimates.
After each party h obtains the global parameters (τ
(t+1)
j , µ
(t+1)
j ,Σ
(t+1)
j ), he/she
computes the conditional distribution of zih given xih
s
(t+1)
ihj =
τ
(t+1)
j f(xih;µ
(t+1)
j ,Σ
(t+1)
j )∑k
l=1 τ
(t+1)
l f(xih;µ
(t+1)
l ,Σ
(t+1)
l )
.
Lin et al. used the following formula to check the convergence criterion:
| logH(θ(t+1);X)− logH(θ(t);X)| < 
where
logH(θ(t);X) =
n∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
log τ
(t)
j f(xi;µ
(t)
j ,Σ
(t)
j )
and  is some predetermined threshold. This criterion is not exactly the same as
equation 5.14. Note that
logH(θ(t);X) =
m∑
h=l
Dh
where
Dh =
nh∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
[log τjf(xih;µ
(t)
j ,Σ
(t)
j )].
So each party h can compute Dh locally. All these parties use secure sum to compute
logH(θ;X). Each party can check the stopping criterion locally.
In this protocol, the values of individual data items are not disclosed and that no
information can be traced to a specific party. However, this protocol discloses the
means and the covariance matrix of each population, which may contain sensitive
information. If what we want to compute is just the clustering results, then this
protocol discloses more information than necessary. Besides, if there are only two
parties, then each party will learn the means and the covariance matrix of the other
party. Also note that this protocol doesn't work over vertically partitioned datasets.
I will develop a privacy preserving EM clustering protocol which works for arbitrarily
partitioned datasets.
70
5.4 Subprotocols
In this section, I present two secure protocols, secure logarithm and secure exponential
function, which I use in the design of privacy preserving EM clustering protocol.
5.4.1 Secure Logarithm
Suppose that a positive real numbers x, represented as [x] = bx2P c in the plaintext
domain, is split between Alice and Bob, [x] = xA + xB (mod N). Alice holds the
share xA and Bob holds the share xB. They wish to privately compute log x with the
result also split between Alice and Bob.
Lindell and Pinkas (2000) proposed a protocol to securely compute log x. Let 2m
be the power of 2 which is closest to x and we write x = 2m(1 + ) where −1/2 ≤  ≤
1/2. Then
log x = log(2m(1 + )) = m log 2 + log (1 + ).
The Taylor series for log (1 + ) is:
log(1 + ) =
∞∑
i=1
(−1)i−1i
i
= − 
2
2
+
3
3
− 
4
4
+ · · · .
The truncated error of this series is bounded by
| log(1 + )−
l∑
i=1
(−1)i−1i
i
| < ||
l+1
l + 1
· 1
1− || .
Lindell and Pinkas used Yao's private circuit evaluation to compute m and 
and then used private polynomial evaluation to compute log(1 + ). Here I give an
implementation all based on homomorphic encryption.
I first show how to privately compute m and . We assume that [x] (= bx2P c)
< 2L, where L is known to both parties. Let xL . . . x1 be the binary representation
of [x]. We define a series of real numbers yi (1 ≤ i ≤ L) such that [yi] has binary
representation xi . . . x1. Note that [yi] < 2
i. For each real number yi, we define mi
and i such that 2
mi is the power of 2 closest to yi and yi = 2
mi(1 + i). Note that
x = yL, m = mL and  = L.
We can compute mi and i iteratively from i = 1 to L. Note that when xi = 0,
yi = yi−1, so mi = mi−1 and i = i−1. We now consider the case when xi = 1. In this
case we know that [yi] = 2
i−1 + [yi−1]. If xi−1 = 0, [yi−1] < 2i−2 and 0 ≤ [yi−1]/2i−1 <
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1/2. Since
yi = [yi]/2
P
= (2i−−1 + [yi−1])/2P
= 2i−P−1(1 + [yi−1]/2i−1),
we have
mi = i− P − 1
i = [yi−1]/2i−1 = ([yi]− 2i−1)/2i−1
[i] = 2
P ([yi]− 2i−1)/2i−1.
If xi−1 = 1, then 2i−2 ≤ [yi−1] < 2i−1 and −1/2 < ([yi−1] − 2i−1)/2i < 0. Note
that
yi = [yi]/2
P
= (2i−1 + [yi−1])/2P
= (2i + [yi−1]− 2i−1)/2P
= 2i−P (1 + ([yi−1]− 2i−1)/2i).
We have
mi = i− P
i = ([yi−1]− 2i−1)/2i
= ([yi]− 2i−1 − 2i−1)/2i
= ([yi]− 2i)/2i
[i] = 2
P ([yi]− 2i)/2i.
I present secure protocol to compute m and  in Protocol 5.2. For convenience,
we set m = −(P + 1) and  = 0 when x = 0.
In Protocol 5.2, m is an integer and  is a real number. Lines 5 and 6 consider
the case when xi = 1 and xi−1 = 0. Lines 7 and 8 consider the case when xi = 1 and
xi−1 = 1. Lines 9 and 10 combine these two cases to compute mi and i. Lines 11-12
combine the case when xi = 1 with the case when xi = 0. In lines 6 and 8 we use
[x] instead of [yi]. Note that [x] is equal to [yi] when i is the largest index such that
xi = 1. For this index i, line 10 computes i correctly and line 12 multiplies i−1 with
0. So only the computation in the i-th iteration matters and the protocol computes
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Protocol 5.2 Secure computation of m and  such that x = 2m(1 + ) and −1/2 <
 < 1/2
Input: a positive real number x such that [x] < 2L is split between Alice and Bob,
[x] = xA + xB (mod N).
Output: an integer m and a real number  such that 2m is the power of 2 closest to
x and x = 2m(1 + ). m and  are also secrets split between Alice and Bob.
1: Alice and Bob use Protocol 3.2 to securely transform [x] into its binary represen-
tation xL . . . x1 whose bits xi are split between Alice and Bob.
2: m0 = −(P + 1)
3: 0 = 0
4: for i = 1 to L do
5: u1 = i− P − 1
6: η1 = 2
P ([x]− 2i−1)/2i−1
7: u2 = i− P
8: η2 = 2
P ([x]− 2i)/2i
9: mi = (1− xi−1) · u1 + xi−1 · u2
10: [i] = (1− xi−1) · η1 + xi−1 · η2
11: mi = (1− xi) ·mi−1 + xi ·mi
12: [i] = (1− xi) · [i−1] + xi · [i]
13: end for{m = mL,  = L}
m and  correctly.
The operations in Protocol 5.2 include addition, multiplication and division with
public divisor. So we can use secure multiplication (Protocol 2.1) and secure division
with public divisor (Protocol 4.2) to implement Protocol 5.2.
Once we know , we can use Protocol 5.3 to privately compute log(1 + ). In
Protocol 5.3, l is the fixed number of iterations. Note that line 4 is the multiplication
of two real numbers. We need to use secure multiplication of real numbers. We can
implement line 5 using secure division with public divisor (Protocol 4.3).
Protocol 5.4 combines Protocol 5.2 and 5.3 to privately compute log x.
5.4.2 Secure Exponential Function
In the development of the privacy preserving EM clustering protocol, we need a
protocol to securely compute y = expx when the real number x ≤ 0 is a secret split
between Alice and Bob. Note that the Taylor series for the exponential function is
expx = 1 + x+
x2
2!
+
x3
3!
+ · · · .
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Protocol 5.3 Secure protocol for computing log (1 + ) (−1 <  < 1)
Input: a secret real number  such that −1 <  < 1 is split between Alice and Bob,
[] = A + B (mod N).
Output: Alice and Bob obtain their respective shares of s = log(1 + ).
1: s = 0
2: t = 1
3: for i = 1 to l do
4: t = t
5: r = t/i
6: if i mod 2 == 1 then
7: s = s+ r
8: else
9: s = s− r
10: end if
11: end for
Protocol 5.4 Secure logarithm
Input: a secret real number x ≥ 0 is split between Alice and Bob.
Output: Alice and Bob obtain their respective shares of y = log x.
1: Alice and Bob use Protocol 5.2 to privately compute m and  such that x =
2m(1 + ) and −1/2 <  < 1/2.
2: Alice and Bob use Protocol 5.3 to privately compute s = log (1 + ).
3: t = m log 2
4: y = s+ t
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We can truncate the series up to the l-th place to approximate the exponential
function and then use secure multiplication to privately compute the polynomial.
However, when the secret number x has large absolute value, the series converges
slowly. As we will see shortly, we will use the secure exponential protocol to compute
r =
∑
i=q expxi, where xi ≤ 0 (i = 1, . . . , q) and one of xi is 0. Since r ≥ 1, we can
ignore sufficiently small terms. So if x is negative and sufficiently small, for example
x ≤ −32, we simply approximate it with 0.
We then compute z = x/64. Now that |z| < 1/2, the Taylor series on exp z will
converge faster. Once we have s = exp z,
y = expx = exp(64z) = (exp z)64 = s64.
I present the secure exponential protocol in Protocol 5.5. The multiplications in
lines 6 and 12 refer to real numbers and we need to use secure multiplication of real
numbers. We can implement line 7 using secure division with public divisor.
Protocol 5.5 Secure exponential function for non-positive real numbers
Input: a secret real number x ≤ 0 is split between Alice and Bob, [x] = xA + xB
(mod N).
Output: Alice and Bob obtain their respective shares of y = expx.
1: Alice and Bob use Protocol 3.1 to privately compare x and −32. Let α = 1 if
x ≤ −32 and 0 otherwise.
2: Alice and Bob use Protocol 4.2 to securely compute z = x/64.
3: s = 1
4: t = 1
5: for i = 1 to l do
6: t = tz
7: t = t/i
8: s = s+ t
9: end for
10: y = s
11: for i = 1 to 6 do
12: y = y2
13: end for
14: y = (1− α)y
I present another secure exponential protocol which computes z = xy when x > 0
and y ≥ 0 are both secret integers split between Alice and Bob. I will not use this
protocol in the development of privacy preserving EM clustering protocol.
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Let yLyL−1 . . . . . . y1 be the binary representation of y. Then
y = yL2
L−1 + · · ·+ yi2i−1 + · · ·+ y1,
and we have the equality:
z = xy
= x(yL2
L−1+···+yi2i−1+···+y1)
= x(yL2
L−1) . . . x(yi2
i−1) . . . xy1 .
Note that when yi = 1, x
(yi∗2i−1) = x2
i−1
; otherwise x(yi2
i−1) = 1. So
x(yi2
i−1) = yix
2i−1 + (1− yi).
Let ti = x
2i−1 . Then ti+1 = t
2
i . I present the secure exponential protocol in
Protocol 5.6.
Protocol 5.6 Secure exponential function for nonnegative integers
Input: two secret integers x > 0 and y ≥ 0 are split between Alice and Bob.
Output: Alice and Bob obtain their respective shares of z = xy.
1: Alice and Bob use Protocol 3.2 to securely transform y into its binary represen-
tations yL . . . y1.
2: z = 1
3: t = x
4: for i = 1 to L do
5: r = yit+ (1− yi)
6: z = zr
7: t = t2
8: end for
5.5 Privacy Preserving EM clustering
Suppose that a dataset of n observations with q attributes, X = (x1, . . . , xn)
T ∈ Rn×q,
is arbitrarily distributed between Alice and Bob, X = X1+X2. Alice owns X1 ∈ Rn×q
and Bob owns X2 ∈ Rn×q. They wish to perform the EM algorithm to cluster the
joint dataset X into k groups but without disclosing their confidential dataset to each
other. The purpose of this section is to present a privacy preserving two-party EM
clustering protocol to enable such applications.
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The design of secure protocols is based on the specific homomorphic encryption,
the Paillier cryptosystem. We use the additive secret-sharing scheme as we present
in section 2.3. We assume that both parties are supplied with a key parameter K.
Alice has input (1K , k,X1) and Bob has input (1
K , kX2). We assume that Alice has
the private (decryption) key and both parties know the public (encryption) key.
As I discuss in section 5.2, the EM clustering algorithm consists of five steps:
initialization, M -step, E-step, checking convergence criterion and final clustering. I
develop secure protocols for these individual procedures and assemble them together
to implement a privacy preserving EM clustering algorithm. Note that the proposed
EM protocol works for arbitrarily partitioned datasets, which include vertical parti-
tion and horizontal partition as special cases. At the end of this section, I prove that
this protocol discloses only the number of iterations.
1. Initialization.
The first step in EM -clustering is to find the initial clustering and initialize sij,
the conditional distribution of zi given xi. As I discuss in section 5.2, there are
several ways for initialization. Based on different methods, we can implement different
privacy preserving initialization procedures accordingly. As an example, we assume
that we select k points randomly as the initial cluster centers and then assign each
point to the closest cluster. If the point xi is closest to the j-th cluster center, we set
sij = 1 and sil = 0 for l 6= j. Based on this method, I implement a privacy preserving
initialization procedure, which I present in Protocol 5.7.
Protocol 5.7 is implemented as follows. In line 1, Alice sends k indices (d1, . . . , dk)
to Bob. Since these indices are randomly selected, they don't disclose any information
about Alice. The k points (xd1 , . . . , xdk) are used as the initial cluster centers. In lines
4 and 6, we use Protocol 3.4 to privately compute the squared distance between the
point xi and the cluster centers xdl . In line 7 secure comparison (Protocol 3.1) is
invoked to privately compare m and d. In line 8, m is assigned the minimum of m
and d. We can implement line 8 using secure multiplication.
The vector (si1, . . . , sik) records the comparison results of m and ‖xi, xdl‖22. Lines
10-14 scan the vector from the k-th entry to the first entry. Once it encounter a
1, it will set the remaining entries to be 0. So if xi is closest to cluster j, we have
sij = 1 and sil = 0 for l 6= j. For example, suppose that the squared distances from
xi to the k cluster centers xdl are (3, 4, 2, 5). After the execution of line 9 the vector
(sil, . . . , sik) is (1, 0, 1, 0). Lines 10-14 sets the vector to be (0, 0, 1, 0).
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Protocol 5.7 Privacy preserving initialization in EM clustering
Input: a dataset X = (x1, . . . , xn)
T ∈ Rn×q is split between Alice and Bob.
Output: initial clustering sij ∈ R for i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , k, which are secrets
split between Alice and Bob.
1: Alice randomly selects k indices dl (l = 1, . . . , k) from {1, . . . , n} and sends these
indices to Bob.
2: for i = 1 to n do
3: si1 = 1
4: m = ‖xi, xd1‖22
5: for l = 2 to k do
6: d = ‖xi, xdl‖22
7: Alice and Bob privately compare m and d using Protocol 3.1.
Let sil = 1 if m ≤ d and 0 otherwise.
8: m = silm+ (1− sil)d
9: end for
10: r = sik
11: for l = k − 1 to 1 do
12: sil = (1− r)sil
13: r = r + sil
14: end for
15: end for
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2. M step.
In the M step we need to compute
τj =
1
n
n∑
i=1
sij
µj =
∑n
i=1 sijxi∑n
i=1 sij
Σj =
∑n
i=1 sij(xi − µj)(xi − µj)T∑n
i=1 sij
The above formulas involve addition, multiplication and division. We can compute
them privately using secure multiplication and secure division subprotocols. We can
improve the performance significantly using the following optimization techniques:
1. To compute µj and Σj, we need to divide them by s =
∑n
i=1 sij. Note that
µj ∈ Rq and Σj ∈ Rq×q, we need to invoke secure division (q2 + q) times. As secure
division is a costly operation we try to reduce its invocation as much as possible. We
can invoke secure division to compute t = 2M/s for some sufficiently large M . Then
we multiply t with the entries in µj and Σj and then divide them by 2
M using secure
division with public divisor.
2. In order to compute Σj, we need to compute sij(xi − µj)(xi − µj)T. We first
compute w = sij(xi−µj) and then compute w(xi−µj)T. This method needs (q+ q2)
secure multiplications. If instead we first compute Λ = (xi − µj)(xi − µj)T and then
compute sijΛ, it requires 2q
2 secure multiplications.
3. The above formulas refer to the operations of real numbers. For each se-
cure multiplication of real numbers, we need to invoke secure multiplication on the
representations of real numbers (Protocol 2.1) and then invoke secure division with
public divisor (Protocol 4.3) to scale them down accordingly. A more efficient im-
plementation is to first invoke secure multiplication only. We scale the representa-
tions of real numbers properly only at the end of the M steps. For example, in the
computation of Σj, we simply use secure multiplications (Protocol 2.1) to compute
Ψ =
∑n
i=1[sij]([xi]− [µj])([xi]− [µj])T and we don't invoke secure division with public
divisor at this moment. Then we multiply it with 2M/
∑n
i=1[sij]. Only this time we
divide them by 2M+P using secure division with public divisor (P is the number of
bits to represent the fractional part of real numbers). Similarly, to compute µj, we
can first compute νj =
∑n
i=1[sij][xi], multiply it with 2
M/
∑n
i=1[sij], and then divide
it by 2M .
4. The computation of µj and Σj involves scalar-vector multiplication and vector-
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vector multiplication. They can be implemented using a series of secure multiplica-
tions. However, we don't invoke Protocol 2.1 individually for each multiplication. We
encrypt the vectors and the scalar only once and reuse them in the computation of
several entries.
Combining all these strategies together, I present a privacy preserving protocol
for the M step in Protocol 5.8. We can implement the secure protocol using secure
multiplication (Protocol 2.1), secure division with public divisor (Protocol 4.3), secure
division (Protocol 4.6). Note that in this protocol, we explicitly deal with the scaling
of the representations of real numbers. For multiplication in the protocol, we simply
use secure multiplication of integers (Protocol 2.1) and we don't need to invoke secure
division with public divisor right after it. The scaling is done explicitly in line 6 and
15.
Protocol 5.8 Privacy preserving M step in EM clustering
Input: a dataset of n observations X = (x1, . . . , xn)
T ∈ Rn×q, a soft clustering
sij ∈ R, all of which are secrets split between Alice and Bob.
Output: τj ∈ R, µj ∈ Rq, Σj ∈ Rq×q for j = 1, . . . , k; These results are secrets split
between Alice and Bob.
1: for j = 1 to k do
2: s =
∑n
i=1[sij]
3: [τj] = s/n
4: r = 2M/s
5: ν =
∑n
i=1[sij][xi]
6: [µj] = (νr)/2
M
7: Ψ = 0
8: for i = 1 to n do
9: ν = [xi]− [µj]
10: ξ = [sij]ν
11: Φ = ξνT
12: Ψ = Ψ + Φ
13: end for
14: Ψ = Ψr
15: [Σj] = Ψj/2
M+P
16: end for
3. E step.
In the E step, we need to compute
sij =
τjf(xi;µj,Σj)∑k
l=1 τjf(xi;µl,Σl)
(5.16)
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where
f(xi, µj,Σj) =
1√
(2pi)q|Σj|
exp (−(xi − µj)TΣ−1j (xi − µj)). (5.17)
The E step can be further divided into four procedures: the Cholesky decompo-
sition of Σj, the computation of −(xi−µj)Σ−1j (xi−µj)T, the computation of log |Σj|
and the final computation of sij. I describe these procedures below and also show
how to implement a secure protocol for each procedure.
(a) Cholesky decomposition of Σj. We assume that Σj is a symmetric definite
matrix. In the implementation, we add a regularization term λI for a small λ > 0 to
Σj to ensure this condition. The standard Cholekey decomposition factors Σj = LL
T
where L is a lower triangular matrix and it involves square root operation. We use an
alternative procedure to perform Cholesky decomposition without using square root
operation. This procedure finds a lower triangular matrix L ∈ Rq×q whose diagonal
entries are all 1s and a diagonal matrix D such that Σj = LDL
T. Based on this
procedure we are able to implement a secure protocol for the Cholesky decomposition
using secure multiplication and secure division only. I present this protocol in Protocol
5.9. Note that we use real numbers in the description of the protocol, so we need to
use secure multiplication of real numbers.
Protocol 5.9 Cholesky decomposition without square root
Input: a symmetric definite matrix Σ ∈ Rq×q is split between Alice and Bob.
Output: a lower triangular matrix L ∈ Rq×q with all diagonal entries 1s and a
diagonal matrix D ∈ Rq×q such that LDLT = Σ.
1: for j = 1 to q do
2: Dj = Σjj −
∑j−1
l=1 L
2
jk
3: for i = j + 1 to q do
4: Lij = (Σij −
∑j−1
k=1 LikLjk)/Dj
5: end for
6: end for
(b) Computation of −(xi − µj)TΣ−1j (xi − µj). Suppose that the Cholesky
decomposition of Σj is Σj = LDL
T. Denote the diagonal entries of D by D1, . . . , Dq.
we know that Σ−1j = (L
−1)TD−1L−1. We can invert L and D, compute Σ−1j , and then
compute −(xi − µj)TΣ−1j (xi − µj). However, we can use a more efficient procedure.
Note that (xi − µj)TΣ−1j (xi − µj) = (xi − µj)T(L−1)TD−1L−1(xi − µj). We can first
compute ν = L−1(xi−µj) and then compute νTD−1ν. Notice that L−1 is a triangular
matrix with diagonal entries 1s and the matrix-vector multiplication L−1(xi − µj) is
more efficient than the multiplication with a full matrix.
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I present the secure protocol to compute −(xi−µj)TΣ−1j (xi−µj) in Protocol 5.10.
Note that we use real numbers in the description of Protocol 5.10. So we need to use
secure multiplication of real numbers. We can implement line 14 using secure division
(Protocol 4.6) and implement the scalar product in line 16 using a series of secure
multiplications.
Protocol 5.10 Secure computation of −(x− µ)TΣ−1(x− µ)
Input: x ∈ Rq, µ ∈ Rq and the Cholesky decomposition of Σ = LDLT, L ∈ Rq×q is
a lower triangular matrix and D ∈ Rq×q is a diagonal matrix. All the inputs are
secrets split between Alice and Bob.
Output: Alice and Bob obtain their respective shares of r = −(x− µ)Σ−1(x− µ).
{Line 1-10 compute U = L−1}
1: U = I { I ∈ Rq×q is the identity matrix}
2: for i = 1 to q do
3: for j = i+ 1 to q do
4: for k = 1 to i do
5: t = UikLji
6: Ujk = Ujk − t
7: end for
8: Ujk = Ujk − Lji
9: end for
10: end for
11: ν = x− µ
12: ν = Uν
13: for i = 1 to q do
14: wi = νi/Di.
15: end for
16: r = −〈w, ν〉
(c) Computation of log |Σj|. As will be clear in next procedure, we need to
compute log |Σj|. Suppose that we have the Cholesky decomposition of Σj, |Σj| =
LDLT and the diagonal entries of D are (D1, . . . , Dq). We know that |Σj| =
∏q
l=1 Dl.
In some cases, the diagonal entries Dl are small numbers. If we compute
∏q
l=1Dl
directly, it may cause underflow problems. So instead we compute
log |Σj| = log
q∏
l=1
Dl
=
q∑
l=1
logDl
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Here we need to privately compute the logarithm q times. Since secure computation
of the logarithm function is costly, we try to avoid its invocation as much as possible.
Note that for each Dl, we can find an integer ml such that 2
ml ≤ Dl < 2ml+1. We
can write Dl = 2
mlδl where 1 ≤ δl < 2. Now we have
log |Σj| = log
q∏
l=1
Dl
= log
q∏
l=1
2mlδl
= log(
q∏
l=1
2ml
q∏
l=1
δl)
= log
q∏
l=1
2ml + log
q∏
l=1
δl
=
q∑
l=1
ml log 2 + log
q∏
l=1
δl
Now that 1 ≤∏ql=1 δl < 2q and we only need to invoke a secure logarithm on it.
I first give a protocol to privately compute ml and δl (Protocol 5.11). In Protocol
5.11, P is the number of bits to represent the fractional part of real numbers. We
scan the binary representation of [x] from the lowest bits to the highest bits. If the
bit we encounter xi is 1, the current values of m and η are computed in line 4 and in
lines 6-10, respectively, and we update them in lines 11 and 12. Otherwise we don't
change m and δ. Clearly we can implement Protocol 5.11 using secure multiplication
and secure division with public divisor.
I next give a protocol to privately compute log|Σj| (Protocol 5.12). We use secure
multiplication of real numbers to implement line 6. The values ml and u are integers.
In line 8, Alice computes µA = νA[log 2] and Bob computes µB = νB[log 2], where
[log 2] = b(log 2)2P c, νA and νB are the shares of ν and µA and µB are the shares of
µ.
(d) Computation of sij. sij can be computed using equations (5.16), (5.17)
directly. However,
rij = −(xi − µj)Σ−1j (xi − µj) (5.18)
may be a small negative number and the value exp rij is close to 0. We may not
be able to compute sij accurately if all of exp rij are close to 0. We can employ a
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Protocol 5.11 Secure protocol for computing m and δ such that 2m ≤ x < 2m+1 and
x = 2mδ.
Input: a positive real number x such that [x] < 2L is split between Alice and Bob,
[x] = xA + xB (mod N).
Output: an integer m and a real number δ such that 2m ≤ x < 2mδ and 1 ≤ δ < 2.
m and δ are secrets split between Alice and Bob.
1: Alice and Bob use secure protocol 3.4 to privately transform [x] into its binary
representation xL . . . x1, whose bits xi are secrets split between Alice and Bob.
2: m = −P − 1
3: δ = 0
4: for i = 1 to L do
5: u = i− 1− P
6: if i ≤ P then
7: η = ([x]− 2i−1)2P−i+1
8: else
9: η = ([x]− 2i−1)/2i−1−P
10: end if
11: m = xiu+ (1− xi)m
12: δ = xiη + (1− xi)δ
13: end for
Protocol 5.12 Secure protocol for computing log |Σ| when Σ is a positive definite
matrix
Input: Cholesky decomposition of Σ, Σ = LDLT. L and D are secrets split between
Alice and Bob.
Output: Alice and Bob obtain their respective shares of r = log |Σ|.
1: u = 0
2: v = 1
3: for l = 1 to q do
4: Alice and Bob use Protocol 5.11 to privately compute ml and δl such that
2ml ≤ Dl < 2ml+1 and Dl = 2mlδl.
5: u = u+ml
6: v = vδl
7: end for
8: µ = u log 2
9: Alice and Bob invoke secure logarithm to privately compute ν = log v.
10: r = µ+ ν
84
standard method to prevent such underflow problems. Let
tij = log τjf(xi;µj,Σj)
= log τj + log f(xi;µj,Σj)
= log τj + log
1√
(2pi)q|Σj|
exp(−(xi − µj)Σ−1j (xi − µj))
= log τj − q
2
log(2pi)− 1
2
log |Σj|+ rij.
(5.19)
Let
ti = max
j
tij (5.20)
and
t′ij = tij − ti. (5.21)
Then
sij =
τjf(xi;µj,Σj)∑k
l=1 τlf(xi;µl,Σl)
=
exp tij∑k
l=1 exp til
=
exp tij/ exp ti
(
∑k
l=1 exp til)/ exp ti
=
exp t′ij∑k
l=1 exp t
′
il
.
Let
vij = exp t
′
ij (5.22)
and
si =
k∑
l=1
vil. (5.23)
Then
sij =
vij
si
.
Note that all of t′ij (j = 1, . . . , k) are non-positive numbers and at least one of them
is 0. So we have 1 ≤ si < k.
I summarize the procedure in Protocol 5.13. Lines 1-4 compute µj = log τj and
wj = log|Σj| for each cluster j. These quantities can be used for the computation
of each point xi. Lines 5-26 compute sij for each point xi. Lines 10-14 compute
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ti = maxj tij. In line 13, if ti ≤ tij, then α = 1 and we have ti = tij. Otherwise
we don't change ti. Note that t
′
ij ≤ 0. So we can invoke Protocol 5.5 to privately
compute vij = exp t
′
ij and then compute si =
∑k
l=1 vil. Also note that in the design
of Protocol 5.5, when the exponent is smaller than −32, we simply approximate the
value of the exponential function with 0. Because at least one of t′ij is 0 and si ≥ 1,
we ignore the sufficiently small terms.
Note that we use real numbers in the description in the protocol, so we need to
use secure multiplication of real numbers. The exception is in line 12 and 13 where
α is either 0 or 1 and it is represented as it is in the plaintext domain and we only
need to use secure multiplication of integers in line 13. We can use secure division to
implement line 24. So we can implement the privacy preserving E step using secure
multiplication, secure division, secure logarithm and secure exponential function.
4. Checking convergence criterion.
The stopping criterion is that the marginal log-likelihood in successive iterations is
sufficiently close, as we presented in equation (5.15). For convenience, we repeat the
equation here: we can check the condition on the relative difference
| logL(θ
(t+1);X)− logL(θ(t);X)
L(θ(t+1);X)
| < , (5.24)
where  is some predefined threshold and
logL(θ;X) =
n∑
i
log
k∑
j=1
τj exp (−(xi − µj)TΣ−1j (xi − µj)). (5.25)
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Protocol 5.13 Privacy preserving E step in EM clustering
Input: X = (x1, . . . , xn)
T ∈ Rn×q, τj ∈ R, µj ∈ Rq and Σj ∈ Rq×q for j = 1, . . . , k,
all of which are secrets split between Alice and Bob.
Output: sij ∈ R (i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , k); the results are secrets split between
Alice and Bob.
1: for j = 1 to k do
2: Alice and Bob use Protocol 5.4 to securely compute uj = log τj.
3: Alice and Bob use Protocol 5.12 to securely compute wj = log |Σj|.
4: end for
5: for i = 1 to n do
6: for j = 1 to k do
7: Alice and Bob use Protocol 5.10 to securely compute rij = −(xi −
µj)
TΣ−1j (xi − µj).
8: tij = rij + uj − 12wj − q2 log(2pi)
9: end for
10: ti = ti1
11: for j = 2 to k do
12: Alice and Bob use Protocol 3.1 to securely compare ti and tij. Let α = 1 if
ti ≤ tij and 0 otherwise.
13: ti = (1− α)ti + αtij
14: end for
15: for j = 1 to k do
16: t′ij = tij − ti.
17: end for
18: si = 0.
19: for j = 1 to k do
20: Alice and Bob use Protocol 5.5 to securely compute vij = exp t
′
ij.
21: si = si + vij
22: end for
23: for j = 1 to k do
24: sij = vij/si
25: end for
26: end for
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Note that
logL(θ;X) =
n∑
i=1
log
k∑
j=1
τjf(xi;µj,Σj)
=
n∑
i=1
log
k∑
j=1
exp tij
=
n∑
i=1
log
k∑
j=1
exp(t′ij + ti)
=
n∑
i=1
log
k∑
j=1
(exp ti exp t
′
ij)
=
n∑
i=1
log(exp ti(
k∑
j=1
exp t′ij))
=
n∑
i=1
(ti + log
k∑
j=1
exp t′ij)
=
n∑
i=1
ti +
n∑
i=1
log
k∑
j=1
exp t′ij
=
n∑
i=1
ti +
n∑
i=1
log
k∑
j=1
vij
=
n∑
i=1
ti +
n∑
i=1
log si.
The last equation requires an invocation of secure logarithm for each observation. We
can reduce the number of secure logarithms using an equivalent formula
logL(θ;X) =
n∑
i=1
ti + log
n∏
i=1
si.
Note that 1 ≤ si < k. We can incorporate the computation of the marginal log-
likelihood function in the computation of the E step. I present the augmented privacy
preserving E step in Protocol 5.14. We assume that the original privacy preserving
protocol for the E step (protocol 5.13) also outputs (the shares of) si and ti in addition
to sij. In the protocol I use G to denote the marginal log-likelihood logL(θ;X).
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Protocol 5.14 Privacy preserving E step (augmented) in EM clustering
Input: xi ∈ Rq (i = 1, . . . , n), τj ∈ R, µj ∈ Rq and Σj ∈ Rq×q for j = 1, . . . , k, all of
which are secrets split between Alice and Bob.
Output: sij ∈ R (i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , k) and the marginal log-likelihood G; the
results are secrets split between Alice and Bob.
1: Alice and Bob use Protocol 5.13 to privately compute sij, si and ti for i = 1, . . . , n
and j = 1, . . . , k.
2: s = 1
3: G = 0
4: for i = 1 to n do
5: G = G+ ti
6: s = ssi
7: end for
8: Alice and Bob use secure logarithm (Protocol 5.4) to privately compute u = log s.
9: G = G+ u
5. Final clustering.
The vector (si1, . . . , sik) ∈ Rk gives a soft clustering of the data point xi. To get a
hard clustering, we assign point xi to cluster j such that sij is the largest among all
sil (l = 1, . . . , k). I present a secure protocol for this procedure in Protocol 5.15.
Protocol 5.15 Privacy preserving protocol for final clustering
Input: sij (i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . , k), a soft clustering of the datasets, which are
split between Alice and Bob.
Output: a vector of integers c ∈ Zn such that ci = j if sij is the largest among all
sil (l = 1, . . . , k). These results are secrets split between Alice and Bob.
1: for i = 1 to n do
2: ci = 1
3: m = si1
4: for l = 2 to k do
5: Alice and Bob use Protocol 3.1 to privately compare m and sil. Let α = 1 if
m ≤ sil and 0 otherwise.
6: ci = (1− α)ci + αl
7: m = (1− α)m+ αsil
8: end for
9: end for
Note that when m ≤ sil, α = 1. Then in line 6 ci is set to the cluster l and
in line 7 m is assigned the value sil; otherwise, we don't change ci and m. In the
implementation of this protocol, sij and m are real numbers and α and ci are integers.
We use secure multiplications of integers in lines 6 and 7. I summarize the privacy
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preserving EM clustering protocol in Protocol 5.16.
Protocol 5.16 Privacy preserving two-party EM clustering
Input: a dataset X = (x1, . . . , xn)
T ∈ Rn×q is distributed between Alice and Bob,
X = X1 + X2. Alice has input (1
K , k,X1) and Bob has input (1
K , k,X2), where
k is the number of clusters and K is the security parameter.
Output: c ∈ Zn such that point xi is assigned to cluster ci.
1: Alice generates a pair of keys (e, d) = G(1K) and sends the public key e to Bob.
2: Alice and Bob use Protocol 5.7 to compute the initial clustering sij.
3: for t = 1 to MAX do
4: Alice and Bob use Protocol 5.8 to perform privacy preserving M step. The
results θ(t+1) = (τ1, µ1, Σ1, . . . , τk, µk,Σk) are secrets split between Alice and
Bob.
5: Alice and Bob use Protocol 5.14 to perform privacy preserving E step. The
results are sij and the marginal log-likelihood function G
(t+1) = L(θ(t+1);X).
These results are secrets split between Alice and Bob.
6: if |G(t)−G(t+1)
G(t+1)
| <  then
7: break
8: end if
9: end for
10: Alice and Bob use Protocol 5.15 to find the final clustering results c ∈ Zn. The
results are secrets split between Alice and Bob.
11: Alice and Bob exchange their shares of ci (i = 1, . . . , n) so that both parties
obtain the final clustering results.
We use secure comparison (Protocol 3.1) to implement line 6. Denote the com-
parison results by ut and its two shares by ut,A and ut,B. Alice and Bob exchange
their shares of comparison results and determine whether they will stop the loop or
not. This is the only place where Alice and Bob disclose extra information besides the
final clustering results. It is equivalent to the disclosure of the number of iterations.
In line 11, Alice and Bob exchange their shares of c and obtain the final clustering
results.
The privacy of the EM clustering protocol is guaranteed by the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1. The EM clustering protocol (Protocol 5.16) discloses only the number
of iterations beside the final clustering results. In other words, if we add the number
of iterations as part of the final results, the EM clustering protocol is secure in the
semi-honest model.
Proof. To prove that the privacy preserving two-party EM clustering protocol is
secure in the semi-honest model, we need to show that:
90
(1) Given Alice's input, her output and the number of iterations T , we are able
to simulate her view during the execution of the protocol.
(2) Given Bob's input, his output and the number of iterations T , we are able to
simulate his view during the execution of the protocol.
Note that we implement Protocol 5.16 using secure multiplication, secure division,
secure logarithm and secure exponential function. All these subprotocols are imple-
mented using secure multiplication. So we actually implement Protocol 5.16 using
secure multiplication only.
We first examine the message exchanges during the execution of Protocol 5.16.
(1) At the beginning (step 1), Alice generates a pair of keys (e, d) = G(1K) and
sends the public key e to Bob. As usual, we denote the modulus associated with this
key pair by N .
(2) At step 2, Alice randomly selects k indices (d1, . . . , dk) from {1, . . . , n} and
sends these indices to Bob.
(3) During each invocation of secure multiplication, Alice sends two encrypted
messages to Bob and Bob sends the encryption of a random number to Alice. Denote
the total number of invocations of secure multiplication by v.
(4) At step 6, Alice and Bob exchange their shares of the comparison results ut
(t = 1, . . . , T ). Alice sends ut,A to Bob and Bob sends ut,B to Alice.
(5) At the last step (step 11), Alice and Bob exchange their shares of ci (i =
1, . . . , n). Alice sends ci,A to Bob and Bob sends ci,B to Alice.
To simulate Alice's view during the execution of Protocol 5.16, we first check the
elements of Alice's view.
(1) Alice has input (1K , k,X1).
(2) Alice uses a sequence of random coins r1,A to generate the key pair (e, d) =
G(1K , r1,A) and uses another sequence of random coins r2,A to select k random indices
according to some function f , (d1, . . . , dk) = f(r2,A). During the invocations of secure
multiplication, Alice uses random numbers in Z∗N to encrypt messages. Denote by
r3,A = (r3,1,A, . . . , r3,2v,A) the sequences of random coins used to generate those random
numbers. Denote all these sequences of random coins by rA = (r1,A, r2,A, r3,A).
(3) During each invocation of secure multiplication, Alice receives the encryption
of a random number from Bob. Denote all these messages by M1,A = (m1, . . . ,mv).
(4) At step 6, Alice receives the shares of the comparison results ut,B from Bob.
Denote these messages by M2,A = (u1,B, . . . , uT,B).
(5) Alice receives ci,B (i = 1, . . . , n) from Bob at step 11. Denote these messages
by M3,A = (c1,B, . . . , cn,B).
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So Alice's view is V IEWA = (1
K , k,X1, rA,M1,A,M2,A,M3,A). I now show how
to simulate Alice's view based on her input (1K , k,X1), her output (the clustering
results ci) and the number of iterations T . The simulator generates a number of
sequences of independent random coins r′1,A, r
′
2,A and r
′
3,A = (r
′
3,1,A, . . . , r
′
3,2v,A), which
correspond to the sequences rA = (r1,A, r2,A, r3,A) that Alice uses in the real execution.
Let r′A = (r
′
1,A, r
′
2,A, r
′
3,A). It is identically distributed with rA = (r1,A, r2,A, r3,A). The
simulator generates (e′, d′) = G(1K , r′1,A), which is identically distributed with (e, d).
Denote the modulus associated with the key pair (e′, d′) by N ′.
I next show how to simulate the messages M1 = (m1, . . . ,mv). As I discuss
in section 2.3, each message mi that Alice receives during the invocation of secure
multiplication is the encryption of a random number and is identically distributed with
Ee(b1, b2), where b1 is uniformly random in ZN and b2 is uniformly random in Z
∗
N . Here
b1 and b2 correspond to r and s3 in Protocol 2.1, respectively. The simulator generates
a uniformly random number b′1 in ZN ′ and another uniformly random number b
′
2
in Z∗N ′ and computes m
′
i = Ee′(b
′
1, b
′
2). m
′
i is identically distributed with mi. Let
M ′1,A = (m
′
1, . . . ,m
′
v). M
′
1,A is identically distributed with M1,A = (m1, . . . ,mv).
I next show how to simulate the messages M2 = (u1,B, . . . , uT,B). Note that be-
fore Alice and Bob exchange their shares of the comparison results ui, Alice has
the share ui,A such that (ui,A + ui,B) mod N = ui. Alice's share ui,A is computed
from her input (1K , k,X1), her random coins rA, the messages in M1,A and the mes-
sages in M2,A that Alice received before the exchange of the shares of ui according
to some function gi,A, ui,A = gi,A(1
K , k,X1, rA,M1,A,M2,A). The simulator computes
u′i,A = gi,A(1
K , k,X1, r
′
A,M
′
1,A,M
′
2,A), which is identically distributed with ui,A. Also
note that we can infer the comparison result ui of each iteration from the number
of iterations T . The simulator computes u′i,B = (ui − u′i,A) mod N ′, which is identi-
cally distributed with ui,B = (ui − ui,A) mod N . Let M ′2,A = (u′1,B, . . . , u′T,B). It is
identically distributed with M2,A = (u1,B, . . . , uT,B).
Similarly, we can simulate the messages M3 = (c1,B, . . . , cn,B). Before Alice and
Bob exchange their shares of ci, Alice has the share ci,A such that (ci,A+ci,B) mod N =
ci. ci,A is computed as ci,A = hi,A(1
K , k,X1, rA,M1,A,M2,A) for some function hi,A.
The simulator computes c′i,A = hi,A(1
K , k,X1, r
′
A,M
′
1,A,M
′
2,A), which is identically
distributed with ci,A. Since the simulator is given the final result ci, it can compute
c′i,B = (ci−c′i,A) mod N ′, which is identically distributed with ci,B = (ci−ci,A) mod N .
Let M ′3,A = (c
′
1,B, . . . , c
′
n,B). It is identically distributed with M3,A = (c1,B, . . . , cn,B).
Let M ′A = (1
K , k,X1, r
′
A,M
′
1,A,M
′
2,A,M
′
3,A). From the above discussion we know
that M ′A is identically distributed with Alice's view V IEWA and thus it is computa-
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tionally indistinguishable from V EIWA. So we can simulate Alice's view using her
input (1K , k,X1), the clustering results ci and the number of iterations T .
Now I show how to simulate Bob's view during the execution of Protocol 5.16
given Bob's input (1K , k,X2), his output ci and the number of iterations T . Bob's
view is divided into seven parts.
(1) Bob has input (1K , k,X2).
(2) During each invocation of secure multiplication, Bob uses a sequence of random
coins r3,i,B to generate a uniformly random number b1 in ZN and another uniformly
random number b2 in Z
∗
N and then computes Ee(b1, b2). Denote these sequences of
random coins by rB = (r3,1,B, . . . , r3,v,B). Here v is the total number of invocations of
secure multiplication. We use the same subscript 3 here as we use in the simulation
of Alice's view because they are both used in the invocations of secure multiplication.
(3) At the beginning (step 1), Bob receives the public key e from Alice.
(4) At step 2, Bob receives k indices that Alice randomly chooses from {1, . . . , n}.
Denote these messages by M0,B = (d1, . . . , dk)
(5) During each invocation of secure multiplication, Bob receives the encryptions
of two numbers from Alice. Bob receives altogether 2v messages in the v invocations
of secure multiplications. Denote the i-th message by mi = Ee(ai, r3,i,A), where ai
is some number only known by Alice and r3,i,A is the sequence of random coins that
Alice uses to encrypt ai. We denote all these messages by M1,B = (m1, . . . ,m2v) =
(Ee(a1, r3,1,A), . . . , Ee(a2v, r3,2v,A)).
(6) At step 6, Bob receives the shares of the comparison result ut,A from Alice.
Denote these messages by M2,B = (u1,A, . . . , uT,A).
(7) At step 11, Bob receives ci,A (i = 1, . . . , n) from Alice. Denote these messages
by M3,B = (c1,A, . . . , cn,A).
So Bob' view is V IEWB = (1
K , k,X2, rB, e,M0,B,M1,B,M2,B,M3,B). I now show
how to simulate Bob's view based on his input (1K , k,X2), his output (the clustering
results ci) and the number of iterations T . The simulator generates a number of
sequences of independent random coins r′B = (r
′
3,1,B, . . . , r
′
3,v,B), which correspond
to the sequences of random coins rB = (r
′
3,1,B, . . . , r
′
3,v,B) that Bob uses in the real
execution. r′3,B and r3,B are identically distributed.
The simulator generates a pair of keys (e′, d′) = G(1k, r′1,A), where r
′
1,A is a se-
quence of independent random coins which the simulator generates to simulate r1,A
that Alice uses in the real execution. Because r′1,A is identically distributed with
r1,A, (e
′, d′) is identically distributed with the key pair (e, d) that Alice generates in
the real execution, and e′ is also identically distributed with e. Denote the modulus
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associated with the key pair (e′, d′) by N ′.
I next show how to simulate the messages in M0,B. The simulator computes
(d′1, . . . , d
′
k) = f(r
′
2,A), where f is the function that Alice uses to select these random
indices in the real execution and r′2,A is a sequence of independent random coins
which the simulator generates to simulate r2,A that Alice uses to generate (d1, . . . , dk).
(d′1, . . . , d
′
k) is identically distributed with (d1, . . . , dk).
I show how to simulate the messages M1,B = (Ee(a1, r3,1,A), . . . , Ee(a2v, r3,2v,A)).
The simulator computes M ′1,B = (Ee′(0, r
′
3,1,A), . . . , Ee′(0, r
′
3,2v,A)), where r
′
3,i,A is a
sequence of independent random coins which the simulator generates to simulate
r3,i,A that Alice uses in the real execution. To show that M
′
1,B is computationally
indistinguishable from M1,B, we define M
′′
1,B = (Ee(0, r3,1,A), . . . , Ee(0, re,2v,A)). Be-
cause e′ and e are identically distributed and r′3,i,A is uniformly distributed in Z
∗
N ′
and r3,i,A is uniformly distributed in Z
∗
N , we know that (e,M
′′
1,B) is identically dis-
tributed with (e′,M ′1,B) and hence (e,M
′′
1,B) is computationally indistinguishable from
(e′,M ′1,B). Besides, because the Paillier cryptosystem is semantically secure, (e,M
′′
1,B)
and (e,M1,B) are computationally indistinguishable. So (e
′,M ′1,B) is also computa-
tionally indistinguishable from (e,M1,B).
The simulations of the messages M2 and the messages M3 are similar to the
simulations for Alice's view. Remember that M2,B = (u1,A, . . . , uT,A). Before Al-
ice and Bob exchange their shares of the comparison result ui, Bob has the share
ui,B such that (ui,A + ui,B) mod N = ui. Bob's share ui,B is computed as ui,B =
gi,B(1
K , k,X2, rB, e,M0,B,M1,B,M2,B) for some function gi,B. The simulator computes
u′i,B = gi,B(1
K , k,X2, r
′
B, e
′,M ′0,B,M
′
1,B,M
′
2,B), which is indistinguishable from ui,B.
Also note that we can infer the comparison result ui of each iteration from the number
of iterations. The simulator computes u′i,A = (ui − u′i,B) mod N ′, which is computa-
tionally indistinguishable from ui,A = (ui−ui,B) mod N . LetM ′2,B = (u′1,A, . . . , u′T,A).
It is computationally indistinguishable from M2,B.
To simulate the messages M3,B = (c1,A, . . . , cn,A), note that before Alice and Bob
exchange their shares of ci, Bob has the share ci,B such that (ci,A + ci,B) mod N = ci.
ci,B is computed as ci,B = hi,B(1
K , k,X2, rB, e,M0,B,M1,B,M2,B) for some function
hi,B. The simulator computes c
′
i,B = hi,B(1
K , k,X2, r
′
B, e
′,M ′0,B,M
′
1,B,M
′
2,B), which
is indistinguishable from ci,B. Since the simulator is given the final result ci, it
can compute c′i,A = (ci − c′i,B) mod N ′, which is indistinguishable from ci,A = (ci −
ci,B mod N . Let M
′
3,A = (c
′
1,A, . . . , c
′
n,A). It is computationally indistinguishable from
M3,B.
Let M ′B = (1
K , k,X2, r
′
B, e
′,M ′0,B,M
′
1,B,M
′
2,B,M
′
3,B). From the above discussion
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we know that M ′B is computationally indistinguishable from Bob's view V EIWB. So
we can simulate Bob's view using his inputs (1K , k,X2), the clustering results ci and
the number of iterations T .
5.6 Experimental Results
I have implemented the two-party privacy preserving EM clustering protocol in C++
based on the Paillier cryptosystem. I used the GMP library (Torbjorn Granlund et
al.) for big integers. I tested the protocol on two separating computers. The settings
of the computers and network system are the same as we used in section 4.8.
In Protocol 5.16, Alice generates a pair of keys for each running of the protocol.
In the experiments, the pair of keys were fixed so that I could use the precomputa-
tion techniques presented in section 3.2. The key security parameter used in all the
experiments was K = 512.
I tested the privacy preserving EM clustering protocol on three datasets: Iris, Zoo
and Glass Identification, which are available in the UCI machine learning repository
(Frank and Asuncion). The Glass Identification dataset contains 6 classes. I consid-
ered only two broad classes: window and non-window. I assume that the datasets
are vertically partitioned between Alice and Bob. The results on other partitions are
similar. I describe the datasets and their partitions in Table 5.1, in which n is the
number of observations, q is the number of attributes and k is the number of clusters.
Alice holds the first q1 attributes and Bob holds the last q2 attributes.
Table 5.1: Benchmark datasets for EM clustering
Dataset n q q1 q2 k
Iris 150 4 2 2 3
Glass 214 9 4 5 2
Zoo 101 16 8 8 7
I report the execution time of the privacy preserving EM clustering protocol in
Table 5.2. I used equation 5.15 as the stopping criterion and used  = 10−6 as the
threshold for all the experiments. The overall execution time equals the number of
iterations times the running time per each iteration (The running time for initializa-
tion and the final clustering is relatively small compared to the iterations). I also
report both the execution time per each iteration and the number of iterations. Note
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that the number of iterations depends on the initial centers the algorithm randomly
selects. A possible method to find a good initial clustering privately is to first run
the privacy preserving k-means clustering algorithm on the datasets and use the re-
sults as the initial centers. Here I just gave a concept-of-proof implementation. I
also implemented an ordinary EM clustering algorithm without privacy concerns in
the Matlab software. In the experiments, I first ran the EM clustering algorithm
in Matlab to select good initial centers. All these datasets have predefined cluster-
ing. The clustering accuracy is computed as the percentage of the correctly clustered
observations. Using the same initial cluster centers as the secure protoocol, the Mat-
lab program finishes in less than 0.1 second on all these three datasets. The secure
protocol achieves the same clustering accuracies as the Matlab program.
Table 5.2: Experimental results of privacy preserving EM clustering on benchmark
datasets
Dataset
Measure Iris Glass zoo
Overall execution time 6643s 4287s 7234s
Number of iterations 13 6 4
Time per Iteration 500s 698s 1979s
Clustering Accuracy 96.67% 90.19% 76.24%
Because the number of iterations depends on the randomly selected initial centers
and varies for each execution of the EM clustering protocol, in what follows I only
report the execution time for each iteration. I first tested how the running time scales
with the size of the dataset. The dataset of size n consists of the first n observations
in the original dataset. I report the results on the Iris and Zoo datasets in Figure 5.1
and 5.2. In all the figures in this section, the execution time is measured in seconds.
The figures show that the execution time per each iteration scales linearly with the
number of observations in the datasets.
I then tested how the execution time scales with the number of attributes. I tested
on the Zoo datasets. I assume that the attributes are evenly distributed between Alice
and Bob. Note that when we don't use all the attributes, the clustering model may
not be accurate. I report the results in Figure 5.3. In the figure, the line is superlinear
in the number of attributes. It is expected to exhibit quadratic asymptotic behavior
when the number of attributes is large.
I also tested how the execution time scales with the number of clusters. I tested
on the Zoo dataset. The zoo dataset is supposed to have 7 clusters. I clustered it
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Figure 5.1: Scalability of privacy pre-
serving EM clustering with respect to
the number of observations (Iris).
Figure 5.2: Scalability of privacy pre-
serving EM clustering with respect to
the number of observations (Zoo).
Figure 5.3: Scalability of privacy pre-
serving EM clustering with respect to
the number of attributes (Zoo)
Figure 5.4: Scalability of privacy pre-
serving EM clustering with respect to
the number of clusters (Zoo)
into 2 to 7 clusters. This is only to test the execution time and the clustering model
may not be useful. I report the execution time in Figure 5.4. We observe that the
execution time per each iteration scales linearly with the number of clusters.
Copyright cOZhenmin Lin 2012
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Chapter 6
Application of the Schur Complement
6.1 Introduction
A dataset is typically represented as a matrix. When data are partitioned among
multiple parties, the data can be represented as a block matrix and each party holds
a block of the matrix. For example, in the horizontal partitioned cases, we can write
the data matrix as
X =
( X1
...
Xm
)
,
where party i holds the submatrix Xi ∈ Rni×p and
∑k
i=1 ni = n. In the vertically
partitioned cases, the data matrix can be written as
X = (X1, · · · , Xm),
where party i holds the submatrix Xi ∈ Rn×pi and
∑k
i=1 pi = p.
A natural question is: can we take advantage of the structure of the block matrix
when we design privacy preserving data mining protocols? Motivated by this question,
we study the potential applications of the Schur Complement in the design of efficient
privacy preserving kernel ridge regression.
This chapter is organized as follows. I introduce the concept of the Schur Com-
plement in section 6.2 and describe kernel regression in section 6.3. In section 6.4 I
explore the potential application of the Schur Complement in the design of efficient
privacy preserving kernel ridge regression.
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6.2 Schur Complement
Consider a (n1 + n2)× (n1 + n2) matrix
W =
(
A B
C D
)
where A is an n1 × n1 squared matrix and D is an n1 × n1 squared matrix.
We want to solve the following system of linear equations:(
A B
C D
)(
β1
β2
)
=
(
e1
e2
)
, (6.1)
namely
Aβ1 +Bβ2 = e1 (6.2)
Cβ1 +Dβ2 = e2 (6.3)
Assuming that D is invertible, we multiply equation 6.3 by D−1
D−1(Cβ1 +Dβ2) = D−1e2.
and get
β2 = D
−1e2 −D−1Cβ1. (6.4)
We then substitute β2 in equation 6.2 and we have
(A−BD−1C)β1 = e1 −BD−1e2. (6.5)
We can solve this equation to get β1 and then substitute β1 in equation 6.4 to get β2.
The matrix (A − BD−1C) is called the Schur Complement of D. Similarly, the
Schur Complement of A isD−CA−1B. Using the technique of the Schur Complement,
we can reduce the order of linear systems, however at the cost of inverting a smaller
matrix and two matrix multiplications. When W is symmetric, it can be showed that
W is symmetric positive if and only if D and its Schur Complement (A − BD−1C)
are both symmetric and positive.
The concept of the Schur Complement has wide applications in numerical compu-
tation, for example in the domain decomposition method (Zhang, 2005). The Schur
Complement is also employed in quadratic programming (Gill et al., 1987; Bartlett
et al., 2006). In my research, I am studying how to apply the concept of the Schur
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Complement to design efficient privacy preserving data mining protocols.
6.3 Kernel Regression
Suppose that we have a training set X = (x1, .., xn)
T and Y = (y1, .., yn)
T, where
xi ∈ Rp and yi ∈ R are the values of i-th observation for the predictor attributes
and the response attribute respectively. We shall assume that p  n. The linear
regression model assumes the linear relationship between the response attribute and
the predictor attributes and tries to find parameters β ∈ Rq which minimize the
residual sum of squares (RSS)
L(β) = (Y −Xβ)T(Y −Xβ).
The minimizer is the solution of the following system:
(XTX)β = XTY.
To explore the non-linear relationship between the response attribute and the
predictor attributes, we can map each point xi to some feature space φ(xi) and find
linear relationship in the feature space. The mapping φ corresponds to some nonlinear
relationship in the original space. The kernel function k(xi, xj) determines the inner
product of any two points in the feature space. For example, the polynomial kernel
k is a polynomial of the inner product of xi and xj and the Gaussian kernel is
k(xi, xj) =
1
(δ
√
2pi)p
exp (−|xi − xj|
2
2δ2
)
where δ is a parameter to control the width of the neighborhood.
The Gram (kernel) matrix G is an n× n matrix such that Gi,j = k(xi, xj). Then
we can solve the following system of equations:
Gα = Y. (6.6)
The prediction of the response attribute for a new observation x is then computed
as
∑n
i αik(xi, x). To overcome the over-fitting problem, we may add a regularization
term to the above equation:
(G+ λI)α = Y.
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where I is the identity matrix and λ is a regularization parameter. For ease of
presentation, I omit the regularization term in the following and assume that the
Gram matrix is positive symmetric.
One direct method to solve equation 6.6 is to use Cholesky decomposition, which
takes O(n3/3) multiplications. In the privacy preserving setting, secure multiplication
is a costly operation. When the number of observations is large, it is not efficient to
use Cholesky decomposition. One alternative approach is to use an iterative method,
for example the conjugate gradient method, to find an approximate solution.
Conjugate gradient algorithm (CG) is an iterative method to solve linear systems
of equations when the coefficient matrix is symmetric and positive. It is known that
the solution to the linear system of equations 6.6 is the minimizer of the function
f(α) =
1
2
αTAα + Y Tα.
We define the residual of some approximate solution αi as ri = Y − Gαi and two
vectors v and u are called G-orthogonal if vtGu = 0. To find the minimizer of the
function f(α), the conjugate gradient method starts with any initial point α0 and
searches along a set of G-orthogonal directions. These directions are constructed
from the residuals step by step. It can be proved that the conjugate gradient method
will find the exact solution in n steps. We may terminate the iteration when we find
a satisfactory approximate solution. I present the conjugate gradient method to solve
equation 6.6 in Algorithm 6.1. See (Jonathan, 1994) for more details.
Algorithm 6.1 Conjugate gradient method for kernel regression
Input: an n× n Gram matrix G, a vector Y ∈ Rn.
Output: an approximate solution of Gα = Y
1: r0 = Y −Gα0; b0 = r0
2: for i = 0 to T do
3: ci = Gbi
4: µi = 〈ri, ri〉/〈ci, bi〉
5: αi+1 = αi + µibi
6: ri+1 = ri − µici
7: if r2i+1 <  then
8: break;
9: end if
10: νi = 〈ri+1, ri+1〉/〈ri, ri〉
11: bi+1 = ri+1 + νibi
12: end for
Given the Gram matrix G, the conjugate gradient methods takes about kn2 mul-
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tiplications and 2k divisions if it terminates in k steps. We also need n2/2 evaluations
of the kernel function to form the Gram matrix.
6.4 Application of the Schur Complement in Privacy
Preserving Kernel Regression
Consider the scenario where the dataset is horizontally partitioned between two par-
ties X =
(
X1
X2
)
, Y =
(
Y1
Y2
)
, Alice holds the first n1 observation X1 ∈ Rn1×p, Y1 ∈ Rn1
and Bob holds the last n2 observations X2 ∈ Rn2×p, Y2 ∈ Rn2 . Alice and Bob would
like to apply kernel ridge regression on their joint dataset, but without disclosing their
confidential data. They need to first form the Gram matrix G privately. We assume
that we are using polynomial kernel function. When xi and xj are held by the same
party, they can compute k(xi, xj) locally. When they are held by different parties,
Alice and Bob can use secure scalar product to compute 〈xi, xj〉 privately and then
use secure multiplication to compute the polynomials. It requires p + d invocations
of secure multiplication to privately evaluate a polynomial of degree d.
Now let
G =
(
G1 G2
GT2 G3
)
G1 is an n1 × n1 matrix whose entries are the inner products of the data points
held by Alice. It can be computed by Alice locally. G3 is an n2 × n2 matrix whose
entries are the inner products of the data points held by Bob and it can be computed
by Bob locally. Alice and Bob jointly compute the n1×n2 matrix G2 using the kernel
polynomial function. So it takes n1n2(p + d) secure multiplications to compute the
Gram matrix G privately.
Kernel ridge regression needs to find the solution of Gα = Y . If we implement
Cholesky decomposition method privately, it takes O(n3/3) secure multiplications. If
we use the conjugate gradient method directly, it takes about n2k secure multiplica-
tions if the iteration terminates in k steps. I now show how to use the technique of
the Schur Complement to improve the efficiency. We write the equation Gα = Y in
block forms: (
G1 G2
GT2 G3
)(
α1
α2
)
=
(
Y1
Y2
)
G is symmetric positive, so both G3 and its Schur Complement G1 − G2G−13 GT2
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are symmetric and positive. Now equation 6.5 becomes:
(G1 −G2G−13 ×GT2 )α1 = Y1 −G2G−13 Y2.
We can apply the conjugate gradient method algorithm 6.1 to the above system,
which is of order n1. Clearly we can use secure multiplication, secure division and
secure comparison to implement a privacy preserving conjugate gradient algorithm.
The matrix-vector multiplication in algorithm 6.1 now becomes
(G1 −G2G−13 GT2 )b = G1b−G2G−13 GT2 b
The key observation is that Bob knows G3. Although it takes O(n
3
2) multipli-
cations to invert G3, Bob can invert it without any communication with the other
party. So no secure multiplication is needed to invert G3. The above matrix-vector
multiplication requires n21 + n1n2 + n
2
2 + n1n2 = n
2 secure multiplications. This is
the same as if we apply the conjugate gradient method to solve Gα = Y directly.
However, now the order of the linear system is n1. We may assume that n1 ≤ n2
and we have n1 ≤ n/2. As we have far fewer unknowns, the conjugate gradient
method converges faster and we can guarantee that it can get an exact solution in
n1 steps. If the iteration terminates in k steps, the number of secure multiplications
is kn2. Once we solve α1, we can use equation 6.4 to compute α2, which requires
n1n2 + n
2
2 = n2n secure multiplications. Note that we need n1n2(p+ d) secure multi-
plications to form the Gram matrix. So the total number of secure multiplications is
n1n2(p+ d) + kn
2 + n2n.
The conjugate gradient method is sensitive to the accumulation of roundoff er-
rors and is typically used with some form of preconditioners. If we apply the Schur
Complement in the iterative method, we don't form the Schur Complement explicitly
and it is not straightforward to construct a suitable preconditioner efficiently. This
problem may be mitigated as we typically use long bits (for example, 1024 bits) to rep-
resent numbers in secure computation and we may allocate many bits (a few hundred
bits) to represent the fractional parts. It remains to be solved to construct effective
preconditioners efficiently in the privacy setting. It is also interesting to explore the
possibility to apply the Schur Complement to other data mining algorithms.
Copyright cOZhenmin Lin 2012
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Privacy is a critically important concern in any application of computer technology
and data mining in particular. The problem of prerserving privacy has attracted great
interest in the communities of data mining, statistics and cryptography. My research
focuses on how to protect privacy when several parties wish to conduct collaborative
data mining. I am particularly interested in the design and implementation of privacy
preserving distributed data mining protocols based on homomorphic encryption.
I have proposed a number of secure protocols for basic operations, including secure
comparison, secure division with public divisor, secure inverse square root, secure
square root, and the secure exponential function. All these protocols are implemented
using secure multiplications. Using these protocols we are able to design a number
of privacy preserving data mining protocols, for example, k-means and k-nearest
neighbor.
In particular, we have designed and implemented privacy preserving protocols for
two important data mining tasks: multiple linear regression and EM clustering. The
privacy preserving multiple linear regression is based on the stable QR-decomposition
method. The two-party linear regression protocol is provably secure in the semi-
honest model. The two-party EM clustering protocol discloses only the number of
iterations. I have implemented these protocols in C++, based on the Paillier cryp-
tosystem. Experimental results on benchmark datasets show that privacy preserving
data mining protocols are feasible for small datasets, although the computational costs
are typically high, so we need to develop new techniques for them to be practical for
larger datasets.
There are a number of interesting questions to be further researched. I have de-
signed and implemented privacy preserving multiple linear regression protocol based
on the Householder transformation. It would be informative to implement privacy
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preserving multiple linear regression based on singular value decomposition (SVD)
and the Givens rotation, respectively, and compare their performances. Another im-
portant task is to design and implement privacy preserving support vector machine
(SVM). Existing protocols on privacy preserving SVM either consider only the poly-
nomial kernel (Laur et al., 2006) or are not provably secure in the semi-honest model
(Vaidya et al., 2008b; Mangasarian, 2009). It is an interesting question to design
efficient provably secure SVM with various kernels.
I have explored the possibility of using the Schur Complement to design efficient
privacy preserving kernel ridge regression protocol. However, it remains to be solved
to construct efficient predicontioners in the privacy setting. The Schur Complement
has potential applications in the design of privacy preserving protocols for other data
mining tasks such as the cononical correlation analysis.
Copyright cOZhenmin Lin 2012
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